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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, South America was dominated by authoritarian,
military-backed governments. A number of democratic governments,
particularly in the Southern Cone of South America, had fallen,' and
the future of democracy in the region seemed bleak. Within the past
half decade, the replacement of these military governments by more
democratic governments portends the 1990s as a decade for the build-
ing of democratic institutions in South America.2
The 1990s have also begun with the rejection of centralized eco-
nomic planning. A number of countries have followed the lead of
Chile in adopting free-market mechanisms and reducing state owner-
ship of the means of production.3 Export driven strategies have re-
placed an import substitution model of economic growth,4 and modest
but hopeful attempts at regional economic cooperation and integra-
L. See generally JUAN J. LINZ, THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REoIMEs: CRISIS,
BREAKDOWN AND REEQUILIBRATION (1978); THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN
AMERICA (David Collier ed., 1979) (describing the breakdown of democratic governments
in South America).
2. See generally Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation, in MEDn
ITERRANEAN EUROPE AND Tm SoUTrrHERN CONE (Enrique A. Baloyra ed., 1987) (compar-
ing transitions to democracy in the two regions); NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CHILE'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1988) (describing the
1988 Presidential Plebiscite). At present, all of the countries discussed in this Article, with
the exception of Peru, have elected governments. An elected government, however, does
not necessarily mean a democratic civil society. For example, if the courts are ineffective
or political institutions do not involve or represent large portions of the population, an
elected government may not signal the existence of democratic institutions. For a discus-
sion of the role that consumer protection laws play in the development of democratic insti-
tutions in these societies, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
3. See generally WYilliam M. Berenson, Legal Considerations and the Role of Lawyers
in the Privatization Process: An Overview, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 159 (1990); Aileen A.
Pisciotta & Sheldon A. Fisher, Telecommunications and Privatization in Chile (1991) (on
file with author).
4. Five Latin American Ministers Embrace Free Trade, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1990, at
A16. The implications of this change for consumer protection is discussed in Rudolf M.
Buitelaar, Changing Production Patterns, Poverty, and the Role of Consumers Unions:
Some Conceptual Notes with Reference to Latin America, 14 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 195
(1991).
[Vol. 17:275
Consumer Protection Laws in South America
tion have begun.5 The North American Free Trade Agreement and
the discussion of a similar agreement between the United States and
Chile foreshadow a larger free trade zone potentially involving other
states in South America.
The last half decade has also seen the reform or passage of a
number of consumer protection statutes in South America.6 In addi-
tion, proposals for such statutes are being actively considered in sev-
eral South American countries. 7 This explosion of consumer
protection provisions could mark the 1990s as South America's "con-
sumer protection decade."
This Article explores the potential for this decade of consumer
protection. By examining the background of consumer protection in
5. For a discussion of efforts at regional economic integration, see generally Albert S.
Golbert & Yenny N. Gingold, Latin American Economic Integration: An Overview of
Trade and Investment Developments in ANCOM, CACM, and LAFTA, 7 SsR AcvzE J.
Ir'L L. & Com. 183 (1979-S0). The development of a limited regional organization, of
course, poses problems for the reconciliation of conflicting consumer provisions. For a
discussion of this problem of reconciliation in the Southern Common Market
ERCOSUR) including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, see Jean Arrighi, In-
tegration and Consumer Protection" The Case of Latin America, 15 J. CONsU IER Pot.' 179
(1992).
6. Brazil: BRAzn. CONSUMER PROTECTION CODE [BRAz. CONSUMER C.] (Law No.
8078 of Sept. 11, 1990, Pinheiro Neto-Advogados trans.). Ecuador CONSUMIER DEFENSE
LAW OFmcIAL REGISTER No. 520, LAw No. 107 [ECUADOR CONSUMER C.] (passed on
Sept. 12, 1990). Ecuadoran President Rodrigo Borja issued a Regulation to the Law of
Consumer Defense in accordance with the temporary provisions of the law. This regula-
tion became effective upon its publication in the Official Register No. 625 on February 18,
1991. [ECUADOR PRESIDmnAL REG.]. Paraguay- Lmw ON PRoTECTorN TO THE CoN.
SUMER OF PRODUCTS AND USERS OF SERVICES AND COMMERCIAL FAIrNESS [PAa', CON.
SUSMER C.] (effective as of June 3, 1991). Peru: PROMULGATED Lmw REGAPDIrNo
CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATrE DECREE No. 716 ArD LEGISLATIVE DEcrEE No,
691 [PERU CONSmiER C.]. Both laws constitute Peruvian legislation on consumer protec-
tion and became effective in 1991. Venezuela: LAW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION [VENEZ.
CONSUMER C.] (published in the OFFICIAL GAZETrE on Mar. 24, 1992).
7. Chile: CHILEAN BILL OF CONSUMER PROTECTION [CHI.E CO,';su r, C.] (drafted
by the Ministry of Economy, Development and Reconstruction in August 1992). Further
consumer protection legislation in Chile is pending: LEY DE Los DERECHOS DE Los CoN.
SU'MIDORES [PROPOSED CHI. CONSUIER C.]. Argentina: Pending is BILL CD-195!92
[PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C.] (passed by the Senate on September 24,1992 and submit-
ted to the Chamber of Deputies) (On October 15, 1993, Argentina promulgated its Con-
sumer Protection Law. The law generally follows the draft discussed in this Article, with
some deletions, such as the exclusion of joint liability for manufacturers, importers, and
wholesalers for harms to consumers. See generally Antonio Serra, Argentina's NXc; La',,
CoNSUaMMoRES Y DESARRoLLO, Dec. 1993 (discussing new law)). Uruguay: A consumer
protection bill dated November 1992 is pending in Uruguay [PROPOSED URU. CossuN.EP
C.]. Bolivia is actively considering a consumer law with the goal of producing a draft in
1993. See Letter from the Ministerio de Exportaciones y Competitividad Econ6mica of
Bolivia to the author (Mar. 15, 1993) (on file with author).
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South America, the Article speculates on the relationship between
these protections and the development of democratic governments
supporting free market economies. This background provides a con-
text for understanding these consumer protection statutes. The con-
sumer statutes and the consumer movement that helped create these
statutes also should aid the development of the democratic govern-
ments that gave birth to the statutes.
The Article describes the character of the recently enacted laws
and of the proposed statutes. This description permits comparison
and contrast among these provisions and assessment of their strengths
and weaknesses. Moreover, South American consumer laws may ben-
efit from developments in international human rights and in new roles
for international organizations in the establishment of regulatory
policy.
Finally, the Article presents the implications of these laws for the
United States. Discussions regarding free trade, the role of the
United States in the international consumer movement, and debates
regarding our regulatory policy all benefit from an examination of
consumer protection laws in South America.
H. BACKGROUND OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAWS IN SOUTH AMERICA
Until recently, consumers in most South American countries had
to rely upon the provisions of their civil codes. Constitutional provi-
sions that arguably protected consumers proved ineffective in provid-
ing protection. The few consumer codes that existed were narrow in
scope or limited in remedy. The principal exception, though not in
South America, was the consumer code of Mexico,8 which has played
an important role in the development of more recent consumer laws.
In addition, the recently enacted consumer protection code of Brazil9
has provided a model for other proposed legislation.
The consumer guidelines of the United Nations10 have helped to
create agreement regarding the basic principles of consumer protec-
tion. International consumer groups have used these guidelines to ad-
vocate specific legislation. These guidelines have also influenced the
8. D.O., Federal Consumer Act of 1975 (Mex.) [MEX. CONSUMER C.]. For an analy-
sis of the Mexican Federal Consumer Protection Act of 1975, see Jorge A. Vargas, An
Overview of Consumer Transactions Law in Mexico: Substantive and Procedural Aspects,
10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT'L. & Comp. L. 345 (1989).
9. BRAz. CONSUMTER C.
10. G.A. Res. 248, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess. (1985) [hereinafter U.N. Guidelines].
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development of consumer protection laws in South America. These
aspects of South American consumer laws provide a uniformity rein-
forcing that created by the important role of the Mexican and Brazil-
ian laws, and stress the role of private actors in legal reform.
The fall of authoritarian governments has also spurred the rapid
movement toward consumer protection laws in South America. The
effect of the adoption of free market economics is more complex, but
also significant.
A brief discussion of this background to the development of con-
sumer protection laws highlights some specific themes. By providing a
context for an examination of the similarities and differences among
these laws, this background aids in their analysis.
A. The Civil Code and Consumer Protection
Without specific consumer laws, consumers must rely on the pro-
visions of the civil code. Historically, the civil codes in South America
had few provisions addressing consumer protection and many rules
pertaining to contract interpretation and warranty favored vendors."1
Comments regarding the application of the civil code in Mexico re-
flect these limitations. "Traditional legal remedies provided by the
civil and mercantile codes offered limited protection, mainly because
they were drafted by legislators in an epoch in which more legal pro-
tection was given to merchants and service providers than to
consumers."
12
Prior to the adoption of consumer laws, some judges used the
civil codes creatively. For example, in Brazil, judges interpreted the
code to apply to consumer contracts, but the scope and character of
the civil code limited the available claims and remedies.13
In addition, in much of South America, the written procedures of
the civil law and the formality of the courts restricted legal access for
many consumers, particularly those of lower economic and social
classes. For example, in Chile, proposals for judicial reform highlight
the inaccessibility of the judicial system to the majority of the popula-
11. CLIFFORD S. WALTON, THE CrvI LAW rN SPAIN AND SPANISH AMEPRCA 352-61.
383-401 (1900) (setting out code provisions concerning sales contracts, rules of interpreta-
tion, and warranties).
12. Vargas, supra note 8, at 348.
13. Marilena Lazzarini, Consumer Defense in Brazil (1992) (unpublished pap.r
presented at the International Seminar, Consumer Protection and the Market Economy,
May 25-27, 1992, in Santiago, Chile, on file with author).
19941
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tion.'4 Reliance by South American judiciaries on civil codes also lim-
ited the development of consumer law.
B. Constitutional Provisions
The constitutions of several South American countries contain
provisions that either expressly protect consumers or guarantee a
broad range of economic rights that encompass consumer protec-
tion.15 Although these constitutional provisions advance consumer
protection by recognizing the importance of consumer interests, these
provisions have not provided significant legal protections for
consumers.
Some constitutional provisions, such as those encompassing con-
sumer protection, are "programmatic" provisions-ones that set goals
and standards for government action. These programmatic provisions
require implementing legislative action. This requirement has empha-
sized the need for statutory protection.
Those constitutional provisions guaranteeing economic rights can
be couched in such broad, hortatory terms so as to create an addi-
tional obstacle to their application in specific circumstances. There-
fore, constitutional provisions have played less of a role in the
development of consumer protection than specific statutory
provisions.
These constitutional provisions, however, do convey the social
and political grounds for consumer protection. Protection of consum-
ers, particularly protection of their health and safety, derives from
principles basic to a democratic and equitable society. Consumer pro-
14. See JACK SPENCE, SEARCH FOR JUSTICE: NEIGHBORHOOD COURTS IN ALLENDE'S
CHILE (1979) (describing the formality of Chilean courts following the civil law tradition in
South America). Proposals for judicial reform in Chile call for creating neighborhood
courts to serve lower income citizens. See, e.g., COMIsI6N DE ESTUDIOS DEL SISTEIA JUDI.
CIAL CHILENO, CONSEJO NACIONAL DE LA JUSTICIA PROPOSICIONES PARA LA REFORMA
JUDICIAL [NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE PROPOSIONS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM] 89 (Eu-
genio Valenzuela S. ed., 1991); Nancy de la Fuente Hemandez, Perspectiva Judicial de la
Administracidn de Justicia [Perspectives on the Administration of Justice] in JUSTICIA Y
LBERTAD EN CHILE [JUSTICE AND LIBERTY IN CHILE] 77 (Guillermo E. Marinez ed.
1992).
15. See, e.g., CONs-TUP.AO DO BRASIL [Constitution] art. 170 (release at 54); PARA.
CONST. art. 107 (release at 54) (Braz.); CONSrITUCI6N DE LA REFOBLICA DEL PARAOUAY
[Constitution] art. 107 (Para.); CONSrrTC6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE VENEZUELA [Consti-
tution] art. 109 (Venez.). For English translations of these Constitutions, see CONSTIM.
VONS OF U CouNRMIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds,,
1990).
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tection represents more than simply another form of economic
regulation.
The limitations of civil codes and of constitutional provisions in
protecting consumers emphasize the importance of additional statu-
tory protections. The content of these statutory provisions increas-
ingly relies on nonlocal sources. The importance of these foreign
sources underscores an "internationalization" of the domestic law of
consumer protection.
C. The Mexican and Brazilian Consumer Protection Laws
One of the important influences on consumer protection laws in
South America has been the Mexican Federal Consumer Protection
Act of 1975.16 Recently enacted and proposed consumer protection
laws in South America rely in part on this Act. For example, the Bra-
zilian code'7 and the proposed Chilean, Uruguayan, and Argentinean
codesis draw on the earlier Mexican consumer law. Also, the Mexican
law has exerted considerable influence because the Model Consumer
Protection Legislation of the International Organization of Consum-
ers Union (IOCU) relies heavily upon provisions of the Mexican
Law,19 and as discussed below, this model legislation has framed the
content of consumer codes.3
Therefore, a brief examination of the character of this Mexican
statute casts light on more recent proposals and enactments. The Fed-
eral Consumer Protection Act, characterized as "social law,"'1 arose
from recommendations emphasizing social equity2 and was supported
16. MEx. CONSUMER C.
17. BRAz. CONSUMER C.
18. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C.; PROPOSED CHILE CONSU.MER C.; URU. CON-
SUMR C.
19. MODEL CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION [IODEL CONSUMER PRo-'rzrIO
LEGIS.] Notes, art. 2(a)-(b); Notes, ch. IV (Informal Working Group on Legal 1SuQs of tha
IOCU Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean, Nov. 19,8) (referring to Mei-
can consumer law).
20. See discussion infra notes 130-31 (consumer sales), 199-205 (guaranteeS, disclaim-
ers, and remedies), and 228-32 (dangerous products) and accompanying text.
21. Vargas, supra note 8, at 356-57. The presidential message introducing the legizla-
tion emphasized that consumer protection would be treated as public law rather than pri-
vate law, as many consumer contracts have been viewed. The discussion of the Mexican
law and other statutes relies principally upon statutory analysis. Implementation or en-
forcement is often difficult to judge. Professor Vargas concludes, however, that application
of the Mexican law has benefitted consumers.
22. Id. The Mexican Consumer Protection Act was seen to benefit lower income con-
sumers particularly. The labor unions supporting and originally presenting proposals saw
1994]
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by a "populist" government.23 The statute embodied eight principles,
including prohibitions against waivers of statutorily established rights,
provision of accurate information, clearly drafted contracts, regulation
of contracts of adhesion, provision for administrative procedures, the
control of advertising, and a variety of special offers and promo-
tions. 24 The substantive provisions of the law (regarding advertising
and labeling, warranties, dangerous goods, sales and promotions, con-
sumer credit transactions, services, and door-to-door sales) reflect
these principles. The statute created a Federal Attorney General for
Consumer Affairs,2 institutes to educate consumers,26 and a number
of alternatives to litigation.27
The Mexican statute draws heavily upon consumer law in the
United States,28 including the Consumer Credit Act, the Magnuson-
Moss Act, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act. Of particular importance for the statute was the
U.S. House of Representatives' version of a U.S. consumer protection
agency.29 Through the Mexican statute, consumer laws in the United
States and unenacted provisions have significantly influenced con-
sumer protection legislation in South America.
Recently enacted and proposed consumer protection laws also
rely on the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code of 1990. For exam-
ple, the proposed consumer laws of Chile and Uruguay draw upon the
Brazilian consumer code.3"
Like the Mexican statute, the Brazilian code reflects popular
movements advocating greater equity between groups and classes in
consumer protection in class terms, with consumer law protecting lower social and eco-
nomic classes. Id. at 350-51.
23. Id. at 350.
24. Id. at 351-53.
25. Id. at 353-54. This office, which was granted considerable independence and made
directly responsible to the Mexican President, was inspired by a U.S. proposal for the crea-
tion of a consumer protection agency. Id.
26. Id. at 354-55. Again, this office was inspired by pending consumer legislation in
the U.S. Id.
27. Id. at 373-76 (describing conciliation, arbitration, and other alternative dispute res-
olution mechanisms).
28. Id. at 345.
29. Id. at 381-82.
30. Letter from Graciela Ruocco, Secretaria del Comit6 Nacional de Calidad, to Dr.
Augusto D. Martinez (Feb. 19,1993) (describing background of proposed Uruguayan code,
on file with author) [hereinafter Graciela Ruocco Letter]; Interview with Juan Pablo
Lorenzini Paci, Assistant to the Director of the Consumer Service of Chile, in Santiago,
Chile (Aug. 5, 1992) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Lorenzini Paci Interview].
[Vol. 17:27.1
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society.3 The Brazilian law also draws upon successful local experi-
ments in consumer protection and recognizes the "vulnerability" of
the consumer in the market for consumer goods.32 Recognition of this
vulnerability supports regulation of consumer markets.
The Brazilian code addresses the protection of consumer health
and safety, product and service liability, business practices, contracts
of adhesion, deceptive practices, debt collection, and unfair contrac-
tual clauses. It also establishes a number of administrative and judi-
cial sanctions. The scope and detail of the statute, which was enacted
in 1990, have made it a model for consumer protection laws in the
region.
D. Role of the United Nations Consumer Protection Guidelines
The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection (Guide-
lines), which were adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1985, 3 also have influenced the development of consumer
protection laws in South America. These guidelines address the phys-
ical safety of consumers, the promotion and protection of their eco-
nomic interests, standards for the safety and quality of consumer
goods, distribution facilities for essential goods, provisions for judicial
or administrative relief, and education and information programs.9-
In addition, the guidelines call for international cooperation with
some emphasis on regional arrangements and agreements3 5
In part, due to advocacy by the United States, the guidelines do
not articulate any international standard beyond the willingness of in-
dividual governments to adopt internal provisions based on the guide-
lines. Specifically, the guidelines state that although enterprises must
follow the laws of each nation in which they do business, the guide-
lines do not establish any minimum international standards of con-
duct.36  Despite these limitations, the guidelines have had
considerable influence, meeting the expectations that the guidelines
31. Lazzarini, supra note 13.
32. Id.
33. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10.
34. Id. These topics form major subsections of the U.N. Guidelines.
35. Id § IV.
36. Id. § II, para. 5. "All enterprises should obey the relevant laws and regulations of
the countries in which they do business. They should also conform to the appropriate
provisions of international standards for consumer protection to which the competent au-
thorities of the country in question have agreed. (Hereinafter references to internationja
standards in the guidelines should be viewed in the context of this paragraph.)" Id.
1994]
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could become accepted as standards of ethical behavior toward
consumers.
37
A comparison of the South American consumer protection codes
with the U.N. Guidelines shows a considerable correspondence be-
tween the two. 3 8 The subjects addressed in the codes closely track
those contained in the Guidelines. 9
The influence of the Guidelines is not surprising given that one of
three regional seminars discussing the Guidelines covered Latin
America and the Caribbean.40 The seminar included participants
from twenty countries as well as observers from governments and
nongovernmental organizations.4 '
The U.N. Guidelines and the activities sponsored under them
have increased awareness of consumer protection standards. There-
fore, these guidelines have done much to inspire the development of
consumer protection laws in South America.
E. Role of the International Consumer Movement
The U.N. Guidelines have provided international consumer orga-
nizations, specifically the IOCU, with a framework for cooperation
among consumer groups in South America. The United Nations re-
gional seminar and the activities sponsored by IOCU42 have helped to
37. David Harland, The United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 10 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 245, 262 (1987) (noting that "[t]he principal significance of the United
Nations Guidelines For Consumer Protection is that they represent international agree-
ment as to the minimum principles which should be contained in consumer protection poli-
cies"). One commentator attacked the guidelines because they were likely to go beyond
voluntary standards, dealt with matters properly within the powers of individual nations,
and constituted ill-conceived international efforts to regulate private activities. Murray
Weidenbaum, The Case Against the U.N. Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 10 J. CON.
SUMER PoL'y 425, 426 (1987). Regulation "can be an imperfect, costly, and at times
counterproductive instrument." Id. at 431.
38. See infra notes 128-29 (sales contracts), 163 (advertising), 197-98 (guarantees, dis-
claimers, and remedies), 224-27 (dangerous products), and 279 (enforcement) and accom-
panying text.
39. Id.
40. See Development and International Economic Cooperation, Consumer Protection:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, Substantive Session of 1992, Provisional
Agenda Item 120), U.N. Doec. E/1992148 (1992) [hereinafter Secretary-General Consumer
Protection Report].
41. Id.
42. See 2 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION CONSUMER UNIONS, REGIONAL OFFICE
FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, CHALLENGES OF THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 4-7 (1990) [hereinafter IOCU REGIONAL RE.
PORT] (describing IOCU activities).
[Vol. 17:275
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establish a network of consumer groups. 43 This network permits the
exchange of information between groups in different countries; an im-
portant part of this exchange involves information about consumer
protection laws. For example, foflowing the U.N. regional seminar,
the IOCU Regional Office for South America developed a model law
on consumer protection.44 This model law, which contains examples
of statutes and regulations in Latin America, "has been used as a
guide by a number of countries in their consideration of new legisla-
tion."45 A comparison of the consumer codes of specific countries
with the provisions of the IOCU model law supports this conclusion.4 '
If technology transfer is viewed essentially as the exchange of in-
formation, the development and exchange of legal materials and strat-
egies fits nicely within the concept. With the globalization of
economies, approaches to regulation, including specific laws, become
a form of technology transferred easily from one country to another.47
As with other transfers of information, the use of legal information
depends upon local factors, but its exchange suggests different alter-
natives, spurs local development, and creates new and powerful syner-
gies with activities in other countries.
The consumer movement has therefore played an important role
in the recent enactment of consumer protection laws. This movement
has become one of the important vehicles for transfer of "regulatory
technology." The involvement of IOCU under the Guidelines has also
helped to create some uniformity in these laws.
The role of the consumer movement also emphasizes the increas-
ing role for private actors in transnational settings, particularly the
43. Id. The January-February 1990 issue of CoNsui moREs v DE-SARROLL., pub-
lished by the Regional IOCU Office, describes the activities of consumer groups throuh-
out Latin America. The IOCU enjoys a consultative relationship with the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations and has been involved with a number of U.N. Orga-
nizations. Secretary-General Consumer Protection Report, supra note 40, para. 65. "In
carrying out the activities [regarding consumer protection] mandated by the Economic and
Social Council, the Secretary-General has enjoyed a particularly fruitful collaboration with
IOCU, a world-wide organization of 174 national quasi-governmental, regional, umbrella
and independent consumer groups in 67 countries." Id. para. 12.
44. IOCU RFGiONAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 35-47.
45. Secretary-General Consumer Protection Report, supra note 40, para. 25.
46. See supra note 20.
47. Formal efforts to create international standards combining legal principles from
both common and civil law countries culminated in the 19S0 U.N. Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods. See generally Co.MNT.ARY ON THE ITEr ,x.
TIoNAL SALES LAW: THE 19S0 ViENA SALES Com%mToN (C. Massimo Bianca et al. cd3.,
1987).
1994]
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role of private actors linked across national borders .4  Improving
communication technology can only strengthen the role of private
consumer groups, permitting them to exchange a wider variety of
product information through nongovernmental channels. 49 Moreover,
if the consumer movement in South America increasingly turns to
evaluation of governmental institutions, as predicted below, 0 these
private consumer groups will adopt the tactics pioneered by nongov-
ernmental organizations in the human rights, labor rights, and envi-
ronmental fields. 1 Groups in one country will follow legal and other
strategies in conjunction with groups in other countries to influence
official policy in individual states, in regional organizations, and in the
international community. Conceivably, within the next decade, the
acronym for transnational corporations, TNCs, could come to refer
not only to transnational corporations, but also to a "transnational
consumer" movement.
The variety of nonlocal sources involved in the development of
consumer protection laws in South America illustrates the accelerat-
ing pace of the "internationalization" of domestic law. For example,
the drafters of the proposed consumer protection code of Uruguay52
referred to resolutions of the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) economic community concerning the regulation of
advertising, 53 the work of a French scholar, Jean Calais-Auloy,5 4 the
U.N. Guidelines, and the Brazilian and Spanish consumer protection
codes. The transfer of legal information and the complex relation-
48. See generally Symposia, Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Private Actors in
International Law, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1994) [hereinafter Private Actors in
International Law]. Of course, transnational corporations already are private actors linked
across national boundaries. The influence of these actors has generated several attempts at
regulation. See generally Samuel K. B. Asante, The Concept of the Good Corporate Citizen
in International Business, 4 ICSID REv.-FoREIGN INVESITENT L.J. 1 (1989) (analyzing
provisions of the U.N. Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations). Transnational
corporations already direct information to consumers in many countries through advertis-
ing and marketing.
49. Private Actors in International Law, supra note 48, at panel 4 (Private Actors in
the Transnational Economy).
50. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 60-61.
51. Private Actors in International Law, supra note 48.
52. Graciela Ruocco Letter, supra note 30. The drafters of the proposed Chilean code
looked to the U.N. Guidelines, the Mexican codes, and the Brazilian codes, as well as to
Spanish law. The section regarding advertising in the Chilean draft relies on the French
code. Lorenzi Paci Interview, supra note 30.
53. Resoluci6n No. 10191 Grupo Mercado Comian (Dec. 17, 1991), cited in Gracicla
Ruocco Letter, supra note 30.
54. JEAN CALAIs-AuLoY, CONSUMER LEGISLATION IN FRANCE: A STUDY PREPARED
FOR THE EC COMMISSION (1980).
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ships that now link consumer laws over several continents suggest that
it will become increasingly difficult to think of even domestic statutes
as purely local.
The explosion of these codes within a brief period directs atten-
tion to political and economic developments that have created a hos-
pitable climate for them. Of particular importance are the fall of
authoritarian governments and the growth of free market economies.
F. The Fall of Authoritarian Governments
Many consumer advocates in South America believe that the ad-
vent of new consumer protection laws is directly linked to the replace-
ment of authoritarian regimes with more democratic governments. - -5
Authoritarian regimes are not willing to encourage action by organ-
ized groups of private citizens. Because consumer protection laws
have required the activities of consumer groups, such laws have fol-
lowed the fall of authoritarian regimes and the opportunity for action
by consumers. For example, by giving consumer associations consid-
erable power, the recently enacted Brazilian law affirms this link be-
tween the replacement of authoritarian regimes and the emergence of
influential consumer organizations.5 6
In addition, consumer protection in South America possesses a
tenor of class conflict,57 more muted in consumer movements in the
United States and in Europe. The significant disparities in wealth and
income in South America emphasize the vulnerability of consumers
and the role that consumer laws play in redressing the imbalances in
power created by those disparities.-s Recent military governments in
South America, for example in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, have
been rightist in their orientation5 9 and unsympathetic to appeals for
class equity.
Consumer protection laws supported by active consumer move-
ments eventually focus on government conduct and action. Soon after
enactment, the enforcement of these laws becomes an issue, opening
up to scrutiny the influence of powerful and organized economic in-
55. E.g., Lazzarini, supra note 13; Jose Vargas, A Five Year Road, Co:-su!.imo.Es Y
DEsARRoLLo, Dec. 1991.
56. BiRz. CONSUZMR C. tits. II, IV, V. For a general discussion of the role of con-
sumer organizations in enforcement of consumer law, see infra notes 272-78 and accompa-
nying text.
57. See supra notes 14, 22.
58. See discussion infra accompanying notes 68-72.
59. See sources cited supra note 1.
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terests on government administration. During the last three decades
the consumer movement in the United States has studied government
misconduct as thoroughly as corporate or business dereliction. 60 At-
tacks on inadequate enforcement of consumer protection provisions
became common and provided the framework for more general criti-
cisms of governmental administration. Therefore, the threat of these
laws to an authoritarian regime should not have escaped notice. The
growth of consumer protection laws in South America should lead to
a similar phenomenon. If correct, this view would predict that the
increasing emphasis in Brazil on the lack of compliance with con-
sumer laws, now centered on business misconduct,61 will soon turn to
governmental enforcement and administration.
Consumer protection in South America implicates values beyond
the economic interests of consumers. In several ways, consumer pro-
tection has been linked to the dignity and worth of the individual. The
Mexican and Brazilian codes as well as constitutional provisions make
these values explicit.62 Moreover, public concern with health and
safety can never be viewed exclusively as an interest in economic well
being, because it always contains the idea of the integrity of the indi-
vidual.63 Consumer movements also rely on the application of group
rights, including rights to organize, to speak and to persuade, to lobby
and to influence government, and to represent common interests.
These "individual" and "group" rights aspects of consumer protection
suggest why consumer protection laws could be unpalatable to an au-
thoritarian regime and indicate why consumer laws and the move-
ments they represent can strengthen and encourage democratic
institutions. This view also suggests the link between consumer pro-
tection laws and human rights, as noted below.6
60. The career of Ralph Nader illustrates this development. Nader first came to prom-
inence with his attacks during the mid-1960s on the safety of the Corvair and the revelation
that General Motors hired private detectives to observe him. During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, Nader focused on the administration of consumer laws and the evaluation of
specific agencies by his young volunteers who coined the term, Nader's Raiders. Public
Citizen, a group formed by Nader, has institutionalized the evaluation of government pro-
grams and supported a range of activities directed at government misadministration and
reform of government.
61. For a discussion of the focus on business misconduct, see Lazzarini, supra note 13.
62. See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
63. Serious physical injury and impairment alter one's self-perception and social im-
age, in addition to causing economic disadvantage. These injuries diminish self-worth,
which is closely linked to personal dignity. Even purely economic wrongs deprive people
of opportunities and choices otherwise available.
64. See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
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A number of reasons support the impression that the explosion of
consumer protection provisions is linked to the replacement of au-
thoritarian regimes in the region. These reasons also demonstrate im-
portant roles for consumer protection laws beyond securing the
economic interests of consumers. Thus, the development of demo-
cratic institutions and the passage of consumer protection laws are
related.
G. The Growth of Free Market Economies
Likewise, the coincidence of the development of free market
economies and the advent of consumer protection laws in the region
permit the conclusion that a relationship exists between the two. Ex-
amination shows the relationship to be complex and less direct than
the coincidence of events might suggest.
Drawing a direct relationship between the advent of free market
economies and the growth of consumer protection is attractive be-
cause the argument for it relies on certain, popularly accepted, as-
sumptions about the free market. The argument also draws on a set of
assumptions that resonate well with an explanation of contemporary
events. The argument uses economic theory, including the application
of economic principles to political institutions, familiar to listeners in
the United States. An abstract of this argument reads as follows.
By relying on consumer choice, free market economies empower
consumers in ways that central planning does not. Consumer deci-
sions rather than administrative fiat control the allocation of goods
and services. In this setting, consumers recognize their economic in-
terests and act to vindicate them. Consumers seek to use the law to
embody and protect these economic interests by acquiring, either di-
rectly or indirectly from the government, concessions such as subsidies
and grants that are often in the form of regulations. Almost inevita-
bly, advocacy for consumer protection becomes identified with the in-
troduction of free market economies.
The power of this argument reflects the praise for free market
capitalism following the demise of the Soviet Union and other com-
munist regimes committed to central planning. These historical events
have vindicated market economies and demonstrated the ineffective-
ness and weakness of centrally planned ones.
While the power of this argument demands consideration, its very
strength also counsels that caution be used in adopting it without fur-
ther examining the relationship between consumer protection laws
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and the advent of free market economies in South America. For ex-
ample, the Mexican Consumer Protection Law of 1975 was enacted at
a time when the economy of Mexico was dominated by central plan-
ning with government ownership of many of the means of produc-
tion. Passage of the Mexican law has been attributed not to the
advent of a free market economy, but to increased industrialization of
the Mexican economy and the creation of a substantial societal seg-
ment capable of classification as consumers.66 Likewise, the President
of the Brazilian Institute of Consumer Defense attributes the creation
of the consumer movement to the Brazilian "economic miracle" of the
1970s that helped to create a class of consumers. 67 With the replace-
ment of the dictatorship by a more democratic government, Brazilian
consumer groups became more active, and consumer protection
emerged as an important public issue.
Still, even among relatively industrialized South American coun-
tries such as Argentina, consumer protection provisions did not arise
during the periods when the economies of these countries were domi-
nated by central planning. Until recently, "consumer protection" pro-
visions in some countries, such as Ecuador, looked much more like
price control legislation than consumer legislation.
Some relationship between market economies and consumer pro-
tection seems clear. Consumer protection, however, represents not
only an affirmation of the market but also a recognition of the need
for governmental response to market failures.
Because of the disparities of wealth in South America, consumer
laws protect and empower the poor in a way less easily perceived in
the United States. For example, South American consumer laws pro-
hibit discrimination in the sale of products68 and exploitation of the
poor and uneducated. 69 Consumer groups represent and protect mar-
ginal groups, and the statutes recognize the economic power created
by consumer cooperatives.70 The codes stress education7' and the ac-
65. Vargas, supra note 8, at 346-49 (describing Mexican economy of that period).
66. Id. at 347-48.
67. Lazzarini, supra note 13.
68. E.g., BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 39; ECUADoR CONSUMER C. art. 36(b); VENEZ.
CONSUMER C. art. 26.
69. See infra note 126.
70. E.g., BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 107. The codes focus on consumer transactions
rather than on insuring the structure of a competitive market. Although several codes
prohibit monopolization and other anticompetitive practices, these codes do not address
the ways in which the preservation of competitive markets protects consumers.
71. E.g., BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 105; PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 54; PRO-
POSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 33; VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 75.
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cess of all consumers to institutions to redress claims.- Consumer
laws reflect the realities of the emerging free market economies of
South America, including the large number of the poor.
In the context of South America, the advent of free market econ-
omies may be linked to consumer protection in another, perhaps more
subtle, way. The advent of free market economies reflects a growing
consensus in South American countries regarding the appropriate or-
ganization of an economy. This consensus rests on the perceived
strengths of the free market and on the collapse of the Soviet Union,
the principal advocate of an opposite philosophy. This consensus has
reduced ideological conflict and the level of violence regarding the
fundamental issue of the structure of the economy and has replaced
that conflict with a new pragmatism. In such an environment, atten-
tion can be turned from often violent ideological conflict to other soci-
etal concerns represented, in part, by consumer protection. Ideology
is less important than the safety of food and water supplies and the
adequacy of products and services.
Consumer laws and the movements supporting them should also
support the growth of free market economies. Consumer laws can
help ensure that consumers receive higher quality goods at less cost. 3
By assuring consumers of minimum standards, consumer laws increase
confidence in the market. In addition, consumer wealth benefits pro-
ducers, and more demanding national consumers can strengthen the
international competitiveness of producers. 4
The context of consumer protection laws in South America pro-
vides a framework for evaluating consumer protection provisions that
have been enacted and proposed. The next section relies on the
themes arising from this context in describing the consumer protection
provisions of South America.
M. DESCRIPTION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
PROVISIONS
Consumer codes, both enacted and proposed, repeat some com-
mon subjects and themes. Although not uniform, the codes address
generally the subjects of consumer credit, consumer sales-particu-
72. See discussion infra accompanying notes 263-71.
73. Buitelaar, supra note 4, at 220. The breakup of state monopolie3 requires con-
sumer laws to recognize the role of market forces. Traditionally these laws addre:s condi-
tions of fair operation of the market and specific instances of market failure.
74. Id.
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larly contracts of adhesion-advertising of consumer products and
services, guarantees and remedies, and dangerous and defective prod-
ucts. Some common themes include the recognition of the imbalance
of information between consumers and producers of products. The
provisions of the codes regulating advertising, imposing labeling re-
quirements, and requiring the disclosure of the terms of sales and
credit agreements reflect an attempt to provide consumers with suffi-
cient information to protect their interests in a market economy.
The concern of the codes with contracts of adhesion, with the reg-
ulation of guarantees, and with limitations on producers regarding dis-
claimers and restrictions on remedies plays on another but similar
theme of unequal power between consumers and producers. These
provisions seek to redress this imbalance by providing some minimum
standards for the protection of consumers. Also, the codes recognize
the importance of enforcement and a number of provisions provide
for both administrative and judicial remedies. Finally, the codes ad-
dress enforcement by empowering consumer groups to represent con-
sumer interests. Representative suits, class actions, and administrative
roles for consumer organizations illustrate some of the approaches
used. Of particular interest are provisions establishing specific gov-
ernmental agencies, some with broad powers, to represent the inter-
ests of consumers within government. Ironically, the U.S. Consumer
Protection Agency, which died in the U.S. Congress, has been resur-
rected and now lives in South America. 5
A description of how the codes address the subjects noted above
helps to illustrate the common themes of these codes. This descrip-
tion also illuminates many of the influences on the development of
consumer protection laws discussed in the previous section.
A. Consumer Credit Transactions and Consumer Sales
Although consumer credit and other sales transactions share
many features, the codes treat them separately. In one sense, regula-
tion of consumer credit transactions forms a specific example of the
application of principles generally applicable to consumer sales.
1. Consumer Credit Transactions
The codes require the disclosure of information from which the
cost of credit can be derived. These provisions augment statutory lim-
75. See infra note 238.
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itations on usury and provide redress for consumers subjected to im-
proper practices.
The Peruvian code illustrates some of the common disclosure re-
quirements. The provider of any good or service must inform the con-
sumer about the following: the price of the good; the size of the initial
installment; the total interest to be paid; the effective rate of interest;
the amount and character of any additional charges such as adminis-
trative fees; the total amount to be paid (which must not be higher
than the initial cash price plus interest and fees); the number of install-
ments or payments and the interval between them; and whether the
consumer has the right to liquidate the balance ahead of schedule with
a corresponding reduction in interest. Moreover, the provider must
supply this information in writing along with the date of the delivery
of the good or the performance of any service.76 The codes in Brazil
and in Paraguay and the proposed codes in Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay require the disclosure of similar, though not identical,
information.77
The Brazilian code regulates data banks and others holding con-
sumer credit records.7s Consumers have access to any personal and
consumer data filed regarding themselves as well as to the identifica-
tion of the information sources.79 Consumers may challenge informa-
tion they find inaccurate, and the databank has five business days to
notify anyone who had received the information of its inaccuracy.
These records must be objective, clear, true and easily understood.,"
No negative information over five years old may be maintained, and
76. PERU CONSUMER C. tit. V, arts. 24-28.
77. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMR C. ch. VIII (mandating disclosure of cash price2, bal-
ance of payment, total interest payment, current annual interest rate, number of paynents
and payment interval, any additional costs, and total financed amount); Brnz. Co;;su!iEr.
C. art. 52 (mandating disclosure of the product or service price in Brazilian currency, de-
fault interest rate and actual interest rate, surcharges permitted by law, number and inter-
val of installments, total sum to be paid both financed and unfinanced, consumer's right to
early liquidation with a proportional reduction in interest, and other charges); PROOSED
CHLE CONSUMER C. art. 31 (mandating disclosure of the product or service price, monthly
interest rate and rate for delayed payment, amount of additional payment, number of pay-
ments and payment interval); PARA. CONSUmER C. art. 15(b) (mandating disclosure of
product or service price, interest, commi ion, administrative costs, delayed payment
charges, advantages of advance payments); PROFOsF_D URU. CONSUMER C. art. 12(2) (cri-
teria for credit, additional charges or sanctions for delayed payments, advantages of ad-
vance payments, date of delivery of good or provisions of service).
78. BRAZ. CONSUMER C. ch. V, § VI.
79. Id. art. 43.
80. Id. art. 43, para. 3.
81. Id. art. 43, para. 1.
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after the statute of limitations on the collection of any consumer debt
has run, the holder of the information shall not supply any informa-
tion that would prevent further access to credit.' Consumers must be
notified of the opening of any credit records or data banks containing
personal and consumer data.83
The proposed Argentinean code permits the consumer to revoke
within five days any installment sales contract providing for four or
more installment payments.84 The revocation must be conveyed in a
certifiable form and requires the consumer to return any goods re-
ceived. If the consumer has not received any goods, the seller must
return any sum received within forty-eight hours of notice of revoca-
tion.85 Although revocation provisions, as discussed below, often ap-
ply only to door-to-door and similar sales, 6 the Argentinean
provision would extend the right of revocation to a variety of install-
ment sales.87
These consumer credit provisions implement the U.N. Guidelines
and are similar to provisions suggested by the IOCU. The U.N.
Guidelines that address the protection of the economic interests of
consumers state that consumers should be protected against "uncon-
scionable conditions of credit by sellers.18 8 These credit provisions in
the codes respond to this concern.
The IOCU refers specifically to the U.N. Guidelines in its instru-
ments to improve consumer protection. The IOCU's Model Con-
sumer Protection Legislation contains a chapter addressing credit
transactions.8 9 The model legislation, similar to the codes discussed
above, requires that the seller inform the consumer of the cash price
of the product, the amount of interest, the effective rate (including
any increase in the rate due to delay in payment), the number of pay-
ments and their interval, and the total price of the goodY0 The model
legislation also gives the consumer the right to prepay the amount
owed with a proportional reduction in interest.91
82. Id. art. 43, para. 5.
83. Id. art. 43, para. 2.
84. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 37.
85. Id.
86. See discussion infra notes 114-15.
87. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 37. Because the code bases the right of revo.
cation on the number of installment payments, it is likely to encompass most long-term
credit sales.
88. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, para. 19.
89. MODEL CONSUMER PROTEC"ION LEGIS. ch. III.
90. Id. art. 18.
91. Id. art. 19.
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2. Consumer Sales Contracts
The statutes stress the importance of accurate information re-
garding the terms of contracts and sales, especially contracts where
the consumer faces a particular disadvantage as with contracts of ad-
hesion, with promotions, and with door-to-door sales. The codes,
therefore, recognize the weaker position consumers generally occupy,
a recognition also reflected in rules of contract interpretation favoring
the consumer.
(a) Sales disclosures
All the codes address the disclosure of information regarding
products, services, and terms of sale. For example, the Peruvian code
imposes a general standard closely tied to the purpose of such disclo-
sures.92 A seller must provide all information necessary for the con-
sumer to make a decision or suitable selection of a product.93 Other
codes, in varying degrees of detail, prescribe more specific require-
ments, often in conjunction with a general standard. These range
from price and weight information, as provided in the code of Ecua-
dor,94 to quantity, weight, characteristics, composition, quality, price,
unit price, expiration date on perishable items, origin, and manufac-
turer as contained in the codes of Venezuela and Paraguay. ' , Many of
the codes require the information to be provided in Spanish and in-
cluded on the product to the extent feasible. 97
Some codes specially address medicines, alcohol, and cigarettes.
In the Paraguayan code, medicines must display statements in Spanish
regarding qualitative and quantitative formula, contraindications, and
secondary effects." As discussed in more detail with advertising regu-
lation,99 the Venezuelan code requires that cigarette and alcohol pack-
aging contain an expression of the harmful effects of the products on a
92. PERU CONSUMER C. art. 5(b).
93. 1I (the Peruvian code gives the right to receive all information -nec2sary" to
make a decision or informed selection of a good or service). Sce also PS WPOED CHILE
CONSIMER C. tit. I, ch. I, art. 4(b) (the consumer must receive "truthful and timely" infor-
mation regarding the characteristics of goods or services, their price, terms and "other
characteristics essential for a rational choice"). The Proposed Argentinean Consumer
Code contains a similar provision in article 4.
94. ECUADOR CONSUMER C. art. 6.
95. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 2(2); PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 2.
96. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 11 (national language): BrAz. CozSU.IEr C.
art. 31 (Portuguese); PARA. CONSUNTER C. art. 2 (national language).
97. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 3; VENEz. CONSUMER C. art. 2(2).
98. PARA. CONSUNER C. art. 4.
99. See discussion infra accompanying notes 148, 161-62.
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consumer's health.10° In addition, other disclosure requirements,
which are discussed below, relate to guarantees, repairs, 10 1 and dan-
gerous products.'02
(b) Areas subject to additional regulation
Of the areas subject to additional regulation, contracts of adhe-
sion receive the most attention in the codes. Moreover, the codes also
regulate particular types of sales.
Generally, adhesion contracts are ones whose terms are imposed
unilaterally upon the consumer, who does not have the opportunity to
modify or bargain substantially regarding the terms.10 3 As would be
expected, the terms of adhesion contracts must be clear, not unduly
complex, legible and easily comprehended. 1°4 Clauses that limit con-
sumer rights must be prominently displayed. 05 The drafters of such
contracts have a particular obligation to act in good faith and to con-
sider the equity of the terms being imposed.0 6
100. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 45.
101. See discussion infra accompanying notes 183-90.
102. See discussion infra accompanying notes 207-13.
103. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 42 (equating adhesion contracts with uniform,
general, or standardized clauses edited unilaterally by the provider without discussion by
the consumer); BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 54 (adhesion contract is "one where the clauses
have been approved by the competent authorities or established unilaterally by the prod-
uct or service supplier, without the consumer being able to bargain or substantially modify
the contents thereof"); PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 2 (proposed unilaterally by the
provider without the consumer being able to discuss its contents); PARA. CONSUMER C. art.
14 (equates adhesion contracts with prearranged clauses); PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C.
art. 14 (equates adhesion contracts with prearranged clauses); VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art.
11 ("one whose clauses have been approved by the competent authority or established
unilaterally by the provider of goods or services without allowing the consumer to discuss
or modify its contents").
BRAZ. CONSUMER C. art. 54, para. 2, provides that inclusion of a clause in a standard
form does not disqualify a contract as an adhesion contract. Venezuela addresses the re-
verse by providing that the insertion of clauses in a contract do not alter its character as a
contract of adhesion. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 11.
104. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 54, para. 3 (worded clearly, easily read, legible print);
PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 23 (requires "transparency" of provisions); PROPOSED URU,
CONSUMER C. art. 14 (legible characters, plain view of person with normal vision, greatest
possible clarity); VENEz. CONSUMER C. art. 12 (written in clear terms, imprinted with visi-
ble and legible characters that provide for easy comprehension by the consumer).
105. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 54, para. 4; VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 13.
106. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 23 (adhesion contracts must contain "equitable"
clauses); PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 14 (must act in good faith with regard for
equity).
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Most of the codes limit the types of terms and clauses that can be
included in contracts of adhesion."07 Some apply these limitations to
all consumer contracts and will be discussed in the section dealing
with the interpretation of consumer sales contracts. 0 3
The Venezuelan code illustrates these limitations on the terms of
adhesion contracts.1 9 Adhesion contracts may not permit one party
to dissolve the contract unilaterally, increase prices or charges, make
the consumer responsible for omissions or errors of the provider, or
deprive the consumer of the right to compensation for defects in the
product."0 The Paraguayan code empowers judges to invalidate
clauses that result in abuse or cause the consumer harm."1 The Vene-
zuelan code provides a mechanism by which an agency representing
consumers can examine and challenge contracts of adhesion.112 The
proposed Chilean code provides that obscure or ambiguous clauses in
adhesion contracts will be interpreted against the seller.11 3
Additionally, some of the codes specifically address door-to-door,
telephone, and other similar sales made outside the offeror's estab-
lishment." 4 Generally, the consumer may withdraw from the contract
within a limited time, ranging from two to seven days.115
A few codes limit promotions in the sale of consumer products.
For example, the Paraguayan code prohibits promotions through bin-
gos, lotteries, cards, dice, contests or drawings in which the purchase
of the product is a precondition to entry, and promises of the delivery
of the product in exchange for containers, wrappers, coupons or other
items that form an integral part of the product.", The Venezuelan
107. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 42; BR.z. CONSUMER C. art. 54; PpOva:ED
CHILE CONSUMER C. ch. III, art. 10; PArA. CONSUMER C. art. 24; PROrOSED UnP. CO-i.
SUMER C. art. 14; VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 15.
108. See discussion infra notes 124-27.
109. VENE. CONSUMER C. tit. 2, ch. II.
110. Id. art 15.
111. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 24. The proposed Uruguayan code permits the nullifica-
tion of contracts not satisfying the requirement of good faith. PROrOSED UPIt. Co';suur. E
C. art. 17.
112. VEN7z. CONSUMER C. art. 14; see also infra notes 239-41.
113. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUmER C. ch. IH, art. 11.
114. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. ch. VII (including mail and electronic direct sales);
BRAz. CONSUtER C. art. 49 (includes telephone and door-to-door sales); PAP". CoN.
SUmER C. arts. 13-14 (includes sales by mail); VENEz. CONSUMER C. art. 15 (include3 sales
by mail).
115. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 34 (five days); Bm,,z. Co.sU.En C. art. 49
(seven days); PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 13 (seven days; two days for perishable goods);
VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 15.
116. PARA. CONSUmiER C. ch. 11.
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code permits promotions, 17 but requires clear information regarding
the character of the promotion and the rights and expectations of con-
sumers." 8 In addition, all promotions must be reported to the agency
responsible for protecting consumer rights.119
These areas pose particular risks for the consumer and the codes
recognize the consumer's vulnerability. General rules regarding the
interpretation and regulation of consumer contracts rest upon a simi-
lar recognition of the relative weakness in consumer bargaining
power.
(c) Contract interpretation and regulation
The codes establish rules of contract interpretation that favor the
consumer. A typical rule of interpretation found in the codes states a
general proposition of interpretation favorable to the consumer 120 and
provides that, when doubt exists regarding the imposition of an obli-
gation on the consumer, the consumer shall be released.121 Likewise,
when the character of the consumer's obligation is in doubt, the least
severe obligation will be imposed on the consumer.122 The proposed
Uruguayan code provides additional interpretative rules. For exam-
ple, hidden or ambiguous clauses will be interpreted against the
drafter; particular clauses will prevail over boilerplate ones whenever
the particular clause is more beneficial to the consumer; and the eco-
nomic objective of the contract and the balance of the interests of the
parties will be considered."z These general rules of interpretation as-
sume a disparity in bargaining power.
The prohibition of certain clauses rests on the same assumption
about power relations. The Brazilian code gives a sense of the nature
of these prohibitions. The code contains a general prohibition against
inequitable or abusive clauses that violate good faith. 24 The code
117. Venezuela defines "promotions" as offering the public goods or services with the
incentive of additionally supplying another or other goods or services of any nature for free
or at a reduced price, two or more equal or different products for the price of one, goods or
service with the incentive of participating in lotteries, contest or other similar events, the
delivery of coupons to be exchanged for goods or services, and free delivery of goods or
services in exchange for books full of promotion stamps. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 46,
118. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 47.
119. Id. art. 50; see discussion infra accompanying notes 239-41.
120. PROPOSED ARO. CONSUMER C. art. 41; BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 47; PARA. CON.
SUMER C. art. 26.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 15.
124. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 51, para. 2.
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also specifically prohibits the following terms: transferring liability to
third parties; reversing the burden of proof to the consumer's detri-
ment; requiring compulsory arbitration of a claim; leaving the supplier
with a right to escape the contract while binding the consumer; vary-
ing the price unilaterally; allowing the seller to terminate the contract
while binding the consumer; forcing the consumer to agree to paying
any charges of collection without creating a similar responsibility in
the seller; or violating established rules in the consumer protection
system.125
As a general rule, product and service suppliers may not take ad-
vantage of the "consumer's weakness or ignorance due to age, health,
knowledge or social standing to force the consumer to accept their
products or services" or, more generally, take excessive advantage of
the consumer.126 These general rules, although not specifically rules
of interpretation or specific prohibitions, clearly structure the relation-
ship between producer and consumer so that the relationship is con-
sistent with the interpretative rules. The statute in Paraguay and the
proposed codes in Argentina and Uruguay prohibit similar though not
identical clauses.127
The U.N. Guidelines lists as a legitimate consumer interest
"[a]ccess of consumers to adequate information to enable them to
make informed choices according to individual wishes and needs."""
The codes' treatment of consumer sales contracts directly implements
this principle. One U.N. guideline provides that consumers "should
125. Id art. 51.
126. Id art. 39. Other deceptive practices include conditioning the supply of one prod-
uct in the purchase of another, refusing to meet consumer demands if stock is atailabIe,
delivering products without a prior request, taking excessive advantage of the conmumer.
performing service without a preliminary estimate and express authorization, diZourafnng
the consumer from exercising his or her rights, failing to comply with official or technical
standards, or failing to state a deadline for performance of an obligation. Id.
127. PARA. CoNsUNMR C. art. 25 (restriction on the responsibility of the offeror for the
quality of goods, waiver of consumer's right to pursue claims); PROPOSED Anc,, CQY%.S LITE
C. art. 41 (limitations of responsibilities for bodily or material damages, restrictions on
rights of consumer or expansion of rights of seller beyond the norms provided by law,
altering the burden of persuasion to the detriment of the consumer). The consumer can
choose whether to nullify the entire contract containing these clauses or to nullify one or
more of the clauses and ask that the remaining provisions be integrated. PrOorsED Un.u,
CON IMER C. art. 16 (clauses reducing responsibility for the quality of goods, clauzcs re-
nouncing consumer rights provided by law, clauses giving the right of one party to unilater-
ally rescind the contract except when such clauses have been made known to the
consumer, clauses transferring the seller's responsibilities to third parties, clauze3 mandat-
ing arbitration, clauses that disproportionately burden the consumer). The consumer may
demand nullification of the contract or of one or more of the clauses. Id. art. 17.
128. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, para. 3(c).
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be protected from such contractual abuses as one-sided standard con-
tracts [and] exclusion of essential rights in contracts." 129 Again, the
codes, particularly regarding contracts of adhesion and rules of inter-
pretation and prohibition of certain clauses, specifically address this
guideline.
The IOCU Model Consumer Protection Legislation requires the
provision of adequate consumer information and regulates promo-
tions and standard form contracts.1 30 For example, such contracts
must be clear, legible, and understandable.13 1 The model law, though
less detailed than many of the codes, clearly structures regulation in
much the same way as the codes.
B. Advertising
The regulation of advertising recognizes its importance and ef-
fect. Advertising is subject to general and to specific restrictions. The
codes address both comparative advertising and the substantiation of
advertising claims. Regulations also concern a range of special situa-
tions and products.
The existence of regulation in this area attests to the perception
that advertising influences consumer choices and consumer behavior.
The Venezuelan code requires that advertising claims regarding char-
acteristics of a product be subject to objective verification.13 2 The
Brazilian code holds a seller to any assurances regarding a product
contained in advertising.13 3 The proposed codes of Argentina and
Uruguay provide that assertions made in advertising regarding spe-
cific characteristics of a product or service obligate the advertiser and
become part of the contract. 3 4 The Brazilian code also requires that
advertising must be conveyed in a way that clearly indicates that it is
advertising. 35
The Brazilian code combines a very broad definition of mislead-
ing advertising with a number of specific limitations. Advertising is
misleading when entirely or partially false, or when in any other way,
including by omission, it is capable of misleading the consumer re-
129. Id. para. 19.
130. MODEL CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGIs. arts. 6, 8, 15-17.
131. Id. art. 17.
132. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 40.
133. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 18.
134. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 8 (absent an express stipulation to the con-
trary); PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 8 (provides for indemnification if the product
does not meet these requirements).
135. BRAZ. CONSUMER C. art. 36.
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garding the nature, characteristics, quality, quantity, properties, origin,
price, or any other data regarding the product or service.'" An omis-
sion regarding essential information about a product renders the ad-
vertising misleading. 37 In all cases the advertiser bears the burden of
proving the truthfulness and accuracy of its advertising. -s
The Brazilian code specifically prohibits discriminatory advertis-
ing and advertising that incites violence, exploits fear or superstition,
takes advantage of a child's lack of judgment and experience, or that
is capable of inducing the consumer to behave in a way that is harmful
to the consumer's health or safety.139 A violation of this last prohibi-
tion regarding consumer health and safety is a crime if the advertiser
knows or should know of the risk of inducing hazardous behavior.1 9
The proposed Chilean code takes a similar approach by regulat-
ing misleading advertising only as to certain specifically enumerated
aspects of the product.141 These enumerated aspects are potentially
broad enough to look like the broad definition contained in the Bra-
zilian code. 142 Moreover, the Chilean code also requires the adver-
tiser to support any statements regarding the product's characteristics
covered by the statute.143
The code of Ecuador obligates advertisers to inform consumers
truthfully and sufficiently regarding the quality, quantity, price, safety,
and use of goods or services.' 44 The most notable of the specific limi-
tations prohibits advertising that damages historic, patriotic, cultural
or religious values. 145 The Ecuadoran code creates a special commit-
tee, whose membership and procedure it describes in some detail, to
apply the provisions of the code and the standards of self-regulation
136. Id. ar. 37, para. 1.
137. Id. art. 37, para. 3.
138. Id. art. 38.
139. 1& art. 37, para. 2.
140. Id.
141. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. tit. III, ch. I, arts. 22-23 (components of the prod-
uct and percentage of each, benefits of the product, basic characteristics of the product
including dimension, capacity, quantity, origin, or other attributes, dates of development or
manufacture, minimum duration, date of expiration, approvals, price, and cost of credit).
The prohibition applies to one who knowingly or with reason to know induces error or
deception in communication or advertising message. Id.
142. Compare B.Az. CONSUMER C. art. 37, para. 1 with PROPOSED CHILE Co-SU.Mwn
C. it. I, ch. I, arts. 22-28.
143. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. tit. I, ch. L
144. ECUADOR CONSUMER C. art. 14.
145. Id. art. 15. Other limitations prohibit dissemination of false information inducing
error or confusion regarding quality, quantity, or price; promotion of improper uZre of
psychotropic or narcotic substances; and false declarations concerning reductions in price.
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adopted by the Ecuadoran Association of Advertisers and the
Ecuadoran Association of Advertising Agencies.146
The Paraguayan code limits the amount of advertising time on
radio and television and limits advertising content for the protection
of minors during certain prescribed hours.147 Among the limitations
are scenes of marked violence, of macabre or erotic tone, and promo-
tions for cigarettes, alcohol, or other products harmful to health. 141
As mentioned above, the Brazilian code and the proposed Chil-
ean code place the burden on the advertiser to prove the truthfulness
of product claims contained in the advertising. The code of Venezuela
contains a similar requirement.149 In addition, the Brazilian code re-
quires advertisers to retain all factual, technical and scientific data on
which their advertising is based.' 50 These provisions impose a quite
significant requirement of advertising claim substantiation because the
codes permit a wide range of people to request substantiation. 15
Two of the codes, those of Paraguay and Venezuela, expressly ad-
dress comparative advertising. Paraguay prohibits comparative adver-
tising.152 Venezuela permits claims regarding the disadvantages or
risks of a competitor's products, but directs the advertiser to be pre-
pared to prove the claim. 3
The Brazilian code allows authorities to exact counteradvertising
from an advertiser who has engaged in misleading advertising. 1 4 The
advertiser bears the cost of counteradvertising and must conduct it as
substantially as was the misleading advertising.155 These requirements
implement the purpose behind counteradvertising, which is to remedy
the misconception created. The proposed laws of Chile and Uruguay
also provide for counteradvertising as a remedy.15 6
146. Id. arts. 6-13, 16-18.
147. PARA. CONSUMER C. arts. 19, 20.
148. Id. art. 21(a).
149. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 44.
150. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 36, sole paragraph.
151. The codes permit administrative and judicial enforcement of rights. For a discus-
sion of enforcement, see infra notes 233-78 and accompanying text.
152. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 22(d) (prohibiting promotion of products or service "by
diminishing or deprecating other products, service or recognizable brands that operate in
the national market or abroad, through direct allusions, figures, or suggestions whether in
words or images").
153. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 40.
154. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 60.
155. Id.
156. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. ch. II, art. 49 (judicial remedy for violation of
advertising rules); PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 41 (administrative remedy for de-
ceptive or abusive advertising).
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Other statutes use advertising as remedies. The Venezuelan stat-
ute requires sellers to publicize, at their expense, sanctions imposed
for products posing a danger to public health and safety."5 7 Free ad-
vertising on state-controlled television is provided to the government
to announce the results of tests and analyses of products and
services.158
Venezuelan law also regulates advertising of certain categories
and types of products. Advertisements of goods or services that en-
danger human health, threaten animals or plants, or harm the atmos-
phere must contain warnings that conform to the advice of competent
authorities. 5 9 These advertisements must describe the risks or the
negative effects that the products or services pose and specify to the
greatest possible extent how the risks can be reduced. 114
The Venezuelan code addresses more specifically the advertising
of cigarettes, alcohol, and goods or services claimed to have medicinal
effects. Advertising for cigarettes and alcohol must express their
harmful effects on health.161 No claim that a product or service has
medicinal or curative effects can be made unless the advertiser has a
written determination from the Ministry of Health and Social Assist-
ance of the relevant benefits and risks. 62
The codes permit extensive regulation of advertising. Broad defi-
nitions of misleading advertising, the number of specific limitations,
requirements of claim substantiation, recognition of counteradvertis-
ing as a remedy, and the creation of enforcement mechanisms demon-
strate the scope of possible regulation.
Several of the U.N. Guidelines refer to the importance of con-
sumer information and consumer choice. For example, "[fair promo-
tional and marketing practices require] the provision of the
information necessary to enable consumers to take informed and in-
dependent decisions, as well as measures to ensure that the informa-
tion provided is accurate."16 3
The IOCU's Model Consumer Protection Legislation also ad-
dresses advertising. The model legislation prohibits both false and
157. Vmz. CONSUMR C. art. 75, para. 10 (requires previous administrative sanction
and negligence on part of company); i& art. 101 (corrective advertising for 'iolation of
advertising rules or rules regarding promotions or publicity of goods or service).
158. ML art. 75, para. 10.
159. Id. art. 45.
160. Id.
161. i
162. Id. art. 40, para. 7.
163. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, para. 20.
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misleading advertising and requires goods and services to be provided
under the terms and conditions set forth in the relevant advertising.'6
The codes have considerably expanded these provisions of the model
legislation.
C. Guarantees, Disclaimers, and Remedies
Consumer protection laws address the imposition of guarantees,
the minimum requirements for use of the term "guarantee," the reme-
dies available for breach of these guarantees, and disclaimers of ex-
pected guarantees regarding consumer products. The statutes vary;
some impose guarantees by law and expressly provide remedies for
their breach and prohibit their disclaimer.165 Other statutes are more
limited and either provide a framework for the offering of guarantees,
establish minimum requirements for using the term "guarantee," or
define the remedies for guarantees that are agreed upon by the
parties. 66
The Brazilian code exemplifies a statute establishing guarantees
by law. It imposes an obligation on the suppliers of consumer goods
for any defect that renders products unfit or inadequate for their in-
tended use or that decreases their value.167 Suppliers are also obli-
gated when the quantity of a product is less than that indicated on the
packaging and labeling or in the advertisement. 8 Similar guarantees
apply to services. Suppliers of services need not be aware of a de-
fect in order to be liable for a breach of this guarantee.
For defects that are apparent or easily verifiable, the consumer
must complain to the supplier within thirty days of actual delivery for
a nondurable good or service and within ninety days for a durable
good. 70 If the defect is hidden, the consumer must complain when
the defect becomes apparent. 7 ' The time for losing a claim is tolled
from the time a consumer presents a claim to a product supplier until
164. MODEL CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGS. art. 6.
165. E.g., PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. ch. IV; VENEZ. CONSUMER C. tit. 2, ch. VII.
166. E.g., ECUADOR CONSUMER C. arts. 11, 13; PROPOSED CHIL CONSUMER C. arts.
22-28; PARA. CONSUMER C. arts. 13-16; PERU CONSUMER C. arts. 20,27,31-32,34-35; PRO-
POSED URU. CONSUMER C. arts. 12, 13, 18-21.
167. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 18.
168. Id.
169. Id. Services as well as goods are covered by most of the provisions of the con-
sumer code. E.g., id. art. 14.
170. Id. art. 26.
171. Id. para. 3.
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it is unequivocally rejected, or from the commencement until the ter-
mination of any civil litigation.172
If a supplier 73 does not correct a defect within thirty days, the
consumer may choose to replace the product with another one in the
same or perfect condition, obtain a refund of the price paid with the
option of seeking recovery for additional damages, or obtain a propor-
tionate reduction in price.' 74 The period in which a supplier must cor-
rect the defect can be adjusted by contract to range from seven to 180
days.'7 In adhesion contracts, any variance of the period for correc-
tion of defects must be set out separately and expressly agreed to by
the consumer.' 76 The guarantee is imposed by law and does not re-
quire a specific contractual term for its effect.177 Contractual waivers
of the guarantee are not permitted. 78
The Venezuelan code and the proposed consumer law for Argen-
tina embody the same approach as that taken in Brazil."'7 Under the
Venezuelan law, retailers must give guarantees "sufficient" to protect
against imperfections in the product, improper functioning, hidden
vices, or other risks associated with products of its kind."--" Similar
provisions apply to services.'" A guarantee must be incorporated in a
certificate that describes the guarantee and the rights of the parties.'e
172. Id. para. 2.
173. The BRAz. CONSUNMR C. makes all Brazilian and foreign manufacturers, produ-
cers, builders, and importers liable, regardless of culpability, for damages caused by their
products or instructions. Id. art. 2. Therefore, liability could be imposed on both a foreign
manufacturer of a good and a Brazilian importer of the good. In addition, suppliers are
held jointly liable for remedies provided to consumers for deficiencies in the net content of
the product. Id. art. 19. Suppliers are also jointly liable for any defects in quality or quan-
tity of the goods and relevant remedies are provided. Id. art. 18.
174. Id. art. 18. For failure to receive the net contents indicated on the container, pack-
aging, label, or advertising the consumer may choose a proportionate reduction in price, a
supplement to the contents, replacement of the product with one of the same kind, or
refund of the purchase price. Id. art. 19.
175. Id. art. 18, para. 2.
176. Id.
177. Id. art. 24.
178. Id.
179. PRoPosED ARG. CONSUNmR C. ch. IV.
180. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 51.
181. Id.
182. Id. At the minimum, the guarantee must include: (1) a description of the guaran-
teed product or service; (2) the identity of the guarantor and of the recipient; (3) the obli-
gations of the guarantor as provided by law; (4) the rights of the recipient with an
indication of how they may be fulfilled; (5) the date of commencement of the guarantee;
(6) the duration of the guarantee; (7) the conditions under which the condition is offered;
and (8) the period in which the guarantor must repair or replace the product or refund the
purchase price (with appropriate deductions).
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In certain circumstances, including deficiencies that render the prod-
uct "not apt" for the use for which it is designed, the consumer has the
right of free repair, replacement, or refund of the price paid during
the term of the guarantee.1 8 3 Unlike the Brazilian law, the Venezue-
lan code does not specify the term of the guarantee and leaves other
characteristics of the guarantee to the parties' agreement.' 4 How-
ever, it does apply certain guarantees to used products of a lasting
nature."8 5 In an adhesion contract, a seller may not make consumers
responsible for deficiencies of the provider of a good or service or
deprive consumers of the right to compensation for deficiencies that
affect the utility and end use of the product.8 6
The proposed code of Argentina is also quite detailed, imposing
obligations on the seller that are similar to those found in the Brazil-
ian code.18 The proposed law specifically preserves the civil law con-
cept of redhibitory vice,8 8 a defect that makes a product useless or its
use so inconvenient that it is assumed that the purchaser would not
have purchased the product if the purchaser had known of the defect.
Parties cannot violate by contract the norms imposed by statute.'8 9
These laws apply to durable goods such as automobiles and give
consumers extensive rights in the event of unsuccessful repairs. Be-
cause these statutes often provide for some liability for foreign manu-
facturers, for example, through indemnification of domestic retailers,
183. Id. art. 57. Other circumstances include when the product (or service) does not
comply with mandatory specifications, when the composition or content of the product
varies from the specifications on the label, and when the product fails to meet specifica-
tions agreed to by the parties.
184. Id. art. 54.
185. Id. art. 58 (including, consistent with appropriate regulations, the period for which
the good is capable of functioning).
186. Id. ch. II, art. 15.
187. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 12. The duty to repair is articulated in detail.
Id. arts. 12-13, 16-18. If after two attempts, the repair performed is unsatisfactory for the
good to fulfill optimally its usage, the holder of the guarantee may ask for a substitute good
of identical characteristics or a proportionate refund of the purchase price, or return the
good and receive its present market value. Id. art. 18. The terms of the guarantee are
required and are similar to those in the Brazilian statute. Id. art. 15. Compare with BRAZ.
CONSUMER C. art. 18, para. 1. The proposed Uruguayan consumer code requires a war-
ranty protecting the consumer against error, defect, or deterioration and prescribes certain
minimum rights of the consumer, including free repair or if repair is not possible, replace-
ment or the return of the purchase price. See PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. arts. 18, 20.
188. PROPOSED ARr. CONSUMER C. art. 19.
189. Id. art. 15.
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they affect transnational corporations producing durable consumer
goods.'9g
Other statutory provisions are much more limited. In Peru, a con-
sumer is entitled to repair, replacement, or return of amount paid only
in circumstances analogous to express warranties. 191 The proposed
code in Chile prohibits the use of the term "guarantee" unless the
character of the guarantee is expressed, including the remedies avail-
able to the purchaser.19 In Paraguay, sellers have obligations limited
to providing a variety of information to the consumer regarding the
characteristics of the product and its use.193
The consumer law of Ecuador requires that durable goods have a
guarantee "for a reasonable time" against manufacturing or operating
defects. 94 The remedies available to the consumer are not specified
although any guarantee must list the obligations of the guarantor.'1-
A guarantee must provide certain information, including the rights of
the consumer and the duration of the guarantee. 196 Because the more
limited provisions impose few obligations on the guarantee, little men-
tion is made of disclaimer. Much of the character of the guarantee,
including its duration and remedies, are left to contract.
Two of the U.N. Guidelines address issues related to guarantees.
One guideline admonishes governments to make clear the responsibil-
ity of producers regarding the "durability, utility and reliability" of
products and services. 197 Another guideline emphasizes the impor-
tance of adequate post-sale service such as providing spare parts.'
A substantial part of the IOCU's Model Consumer Protection
Legislation concerns guarantees. 199 Most guarantees imposed by the
model legislation are analogous to express warranties or provisions for
190. E.g., PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 14; supra note 173 (discussing provisions
of the BRAz. CONSUNIER C.); VENEZ. CoNsUMER C. art. 44 (retailer is made responsible
for making the guarantee effective).
191. PERU CONSU~mR C. art. 31 (when the good does not meet product spcification.
when the content does not comply with the good's label, when the gold or silver content of
metals or jewelry is less than the indicated content on them, or %%hen the product %as
acquired with a specific guarantee).
192. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUmER C. art. 25.
193. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 15.
194. ECUADOR CONSUMER C. art. 11.
195. Id.
196. PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 18.
197. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, para. 16.
198. Id. para. 18.
199. MODEL CONSUMER PRO"ECrlON LEOtS. arts. 7-16, 20-29.
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
failure to meet specific weight and measurement requirements. 2°°
The model law, however, gives the consumer remedies of repair or
reimbursement when defects render the product "not appropriate for
its designated use."'20 1 This guarantee and related guarantees in the
consumer laws discussed above are analogous to the implied warranty
of merchantability in the United States.2° In addition to the remedies
noted, the consumer may in cases of nonfulfillment of the guarantee
rescind the contract.20 3 Unless otherwise agreed upon, claims for non-
fulfillment must be made within one year of the actual delivery of the
product.2 4 All persons in the chain of distribution and sales including
the producers are liable for a defect in the product if the defect existed
at the time it left the hands of the party charged with liability.2 5
D. Dangerous Products and Injuries to Consumers or Users
As described above,2°6 many of the statutes address potential
product defects, including risks of injury to consumers, by requiring
the disclosure of information to consumers. Several of the statutes
employ a similar approach to dangerous products. In addition, the
codes outline characteristics of dangerous products and provide for
damages for injuries resulting from those products. Some of the codes
permit joint liability of manufacturers, importers, and sellers.
Most of the statutes require sellers to provide some information
about dangerous products through warnings, instructions, and manu-
als.207 They vary, however, regarding the impact of such warnings on
the rights of redress in damages by injured consumers. Although
many codes are silent on the effect of warnings, 0 s the statutes of Ec-
uador and Brazil illustrate different positions. The law of Ecuador
200. Id. arts. 6, 9-10, 21.
201. Id. art. 21(e).
202. U.C.C. § 2-315.
203. MODEL CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGIS. art. 24 (addressing delay in fulfillment),
204. Id. art. 25.
205. Id. art. 23.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 165-205.
207. PROPOSED ARo. CONSUMER C. art. 6; BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 9; PROPOSED
CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 38; ECUADOR PRSIDENIAL REG. ch. I, art. 1; PARA. CONSUMER
C. art. 15; PERU CONSUMER C. art. 9; PROPOSED URO. CONSUMER C. art. 6 (regarding
"particularly dangerous" products); VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 45 (regarding advertising of
products posing a danger to human life). Brazil also places an obligation on public officials
to warn consumers of products that are hazardous to public health and safety. BRAz. CON-
SUMER C. art. 10.
208. E.g., the consumer protection codes of Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Ven-
ezuela. Many of the codes provide for administrative enforcement; see discussion infra
accompanying notes 234-54.
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provides that, as to risks for which a warning has been given, adequate
use of the product is the responsibility of the consumer.F0 Brazilian
law, however, expressly provides other consumer remedies210
These codes may also require that the seller or manufacturer no-
tify consumers or government authorities of new or additional risks
discovered 1' For example, the law of Peru states that when the pro-
vider of a product detects an unforeseeable risk, that provider must
take steps to reduce the risk including notifying government officials
and consumers, removing the product from sale or providing for its
repair or substitutionm2 The proposed law of Uruguay allows a pub-
lic agency to warn the public through advertisements at the expense of
the provider of the product.213
Generally, under these laws, a dangerous product is one that
poses a risk of harm to the consumer beyond those risks considered
normal and foreseeable from the nature of the product3' 4 The Peru-
vian law speaks in terms of unjustifiable risks or risks about which the
consumer has not been warned 15 This law establishes criteria for de-
termining whether a product causing physical injury to a consumer is
defective. Among the factors considered are the design of the prod-
uct; the manner in which the product has been placed in commerce,
including its appearance, advertising, instructions and warnings; the
foreseeable use of the product; and the materials, content, and condi-
tion of the product 216 These criteria resemble those used in U.S. tort
law in determining whether a product in a defective condition is un-
reasonably dangerous 1 7
The statutes recognize different levels of risk and provide differ-
ent remedies for products posing greater than ordinary risks. For ex-
209. See ECUADOR PRnsmENrrrAL REo. ch. I, art. I.
210. BRAZ. CONSUMER C. art. 9.
211. BRAz. CONSUMIER C. art. 10, para. 1; PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMIER C. art. 39 (dis-
covered prior to the introduction of the product); PERU CONSUMER C. art. 10; Pi.orosED
URU. CONSUMER C. art. 7.
212. PERU CONSUMER C. art. 10.
213. PROPOSED URU. CoNsuiER C. art. 41.
214. PROPOSED ARr. CONSUMER C. art. 5 (conditions foreseen or those of normal use);
BRAZ. CONSUMER C. art. 8 (normal and foreseeable risks); PROPOSED CHILE CONSUIMEn.
C. art. 37 (normal conditions and those foreseen at the time of utilization); ProroMsED
URU. CONSUMER C. art. 6 (normal or foreseeable in accordance to their nature and func-
tion); VENEz. CONSUMER C. art. 51 (hidden vices or any other risk in accordance with the
nature of the good).
215. PERU CONSUMER C. art. 9.
216. Id. art. 32.
217. See, e-g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (19S$).
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ample, the Brazilian statute imposes special obligations regarding
products that suppliers know or ought to know are extremely harmful
or hazardous.21 The Paraguayan law permits courts to prohibit the
sale of products that pose an imminent danger to the well being of
consumers,219 and the laws of Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela give
government agencies power to regulate products posing high levels of
risk.220
Damages for consumer injuries include physical harm as well as
consequential and "moral damages." 1 Often there is joint and sev-
eral liability for these damages and a right of indemnification.222
Under the Brazilian code, the retailer is liable only if the manufac-
turer is not or cannot be identified.2z
The U.N. Guidelines address consumer health and safety. One of
the principles of the Guidelines is "[tihe protection of consumers from
hazards to their health and safety."22 4 To satisfy this principle the
Guidelines call for governments to ensure that products are safe for
"either intended or normally foreseeable use. ' '22- Manufacturers and
distributors should inform consumers when they become aware of un-
foreseen hazards after products are marketed.2 6 In addition, govern-
ments are encouraged to provide for recall or modification when a
product is seriously defective or constitutes a "substantial and severe
hazard even when properly used." 227
The IOCU's Model Consumer Protection Legislation also ad-
dresses harmful or dangerous products.2 The model legislation re-
quires warnings and instructions regarding dangers posed by
218. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 10 (shall not market; after introduction must use public-
ity including press, radio, and television to alert consumers).
219. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 32.
220. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 55; ECUADOR CONSUMER C. art. 5; VENEZ. CONSUMER
C. arts. 63-65.
221. See, e.g., PROPOSED ARo. CONSUMER C. art. 45; PERU CONSUMER C. art. 32.
222. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 44 (concurrent responsibility of producer,
manufacturer, importer, seller, and provider unless party can show it is outside the cause of
the damage); PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 40 (joint responsibility or producer, im-
porter, and first distributer) (as to severely harmful products); PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 35
(solidary responsibility, except if party can show exclusion from commission of the illegal
act); PERU CONSUMER C. art. 32 (solidary responsibility).
223. BRA_. CONSUMER C. art. 12 (also if the retailer does not adequately preserve per-
ishable goods).
224. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, para. 3(a).
225. Id. para. 9.
226. Id. para. 11 (consumers should be notified "as appropriate").
227. Id. para. 12.
228. MODEL CONSUMER PROTECION LEGIS. Ch. V.
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products.229 Under the legislation, damages seem available for a fail-
ure to warn rather than for the sale of the dangerous product.2 ° The
model legislation also mandates recall or substitution of products that
constitute a significant danger even if properly used and withdrawal
from the market of products shown to seriously endanger the
public.231
The IOCU model legislation is not as strong as the U.N. Guide-
lines because the model legislation does not impose an unequivocal
duty to provide a product safe for its intended and foreseeable use. 2
Also, several statutes such as those proposed in Chile and Argentina
as well as the laws of Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela lack some of
the provisions contained in the model legislation. For example, sev-
eral of these provisions fail to address recall of products that are not
safe for ordinary use or to require withdrawal of dangerous products.
E. Enforcement
The experience of the consumer movement in the United States
teaches that consumer laws exist only to the extent they are enforced.
The implementation rather than the contents of a statute defines the
law.233 Because many of these statutes in South America are recent
enactments and because of the difficulty in assessing enforcement,
particularly in other countries, the effect of these laws remains
uncertain.
229. d art. 30.
230. Id. Article 30 requires such warnings. Article 31 imposes special obligations on
suppliers and producers of consumer foods. Article 32 provides damage for injuries result-
ing from violations of articles 30 or 31. Therefore, for most products the damages seem to
require a failure to warn. The notes to the draft state that the draft regulates the "market-
ing, distribution, and sales of harmful or dangerous products in more detail, incorporating
the idea of 'strict liability' of the producer." Although this result may follow for food
products, it is unclear that the language of the draft succeeds in imposing strict liability.
231. Id. art. 33.
232. Compare note 225 with note 230.
233. As with any extensive statutory provision, each of these consumer codes presents a
number of interpretative problems. The application of these laws could vary substantially
depending on the meaning given to particular provisions. Complicating interpretation is
the limited role that precedent may play in the application of these provisions. Richard B.
Cappalli, Comparative South American Civil Procedure: A Chilean Perspective, 21 U.
MIAL. INTER-Am. L. Rnv. 239, 279 (1989-90). There are "remarkable congruencels]" in
civil procedures in the countries of South America. Id. at 242. With the exception of Ven-
ezuela, where case lawv is a "relevant and even mandatory source of law," id. at 243. these
South American countries follow the approach of Chile, where "the concept of precedent
rarely appears in the Chilean appellate decisions." Id. at 279. Therefore, in addition to
issues regarding enforcement structures and powers, the issue of interpretation also creates
considerable uncertainty about the application of these consumer laws.
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Despite this uncertainty, the statutes permit some assessment of
enforcement. The statutes use two principal enforcement mecha-
nisms: government agencies and the courts. In addition, several of the
statutes establish new and potentially important roles for consumer
organizations. Examination of these aspects of enforcement allows
judgments regarding the statutes' potential efficacy.
1. Administrative Enforcement
An evaluation of a particular regulatory scheme in the United
States usually involves an examination of the structures of regulatory
agencies, their powers, and the sanctions available to them. A similar
approach permits evaluation of the regulatory schemes contained in
the consumer protection statutes in South America.
Some statutes give administrative authority to ministries, often
pre-existing, that encompass a range of duties beyond consumer pro-
tection. For example, the proposed Argentinean statute places admin-
istrative authority in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. 23 4
Other statutes rely on agencies more specifically assigned to protect-
ing consumers. The proposed Uruguayan code places authority in the
General Board of Consumer Defense,235 and the Venezuelan code
places authority in the Institute of Defense and Education of the Con-
sumer (IDEC).236 These bodies, as well as the National Consumer
Protection Department of the Ministry of Justice (established in Brazil
to supplement other administrative enforcement), z37 coordinate con-
sumer protection powers that, in addition to administrative investiga-
tions and sanctions, include research, testing, education, and
evaluation of consumer statutes and regulations.38
234. PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 46.
235. PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 33.
236. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 63.
237. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 106 (the National Consumer Protection Department per-
forms a coordinating and oversight role); PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 50 (the Chil-
ean code also establishes National Consumer Service within the Ministry of Economy
Development and Reconstruction to serve a coordinating function).
238. In South America, consumer protection regulation is more likely to be focused in a
specific agency than in the United States, where even at the federal level consumer regula-
tion is divided among a number of administrative agencies with little centralized direction.
The centralized direction and advocacy contained in several South American consumer
statutes reflect proposals for a Consumer Protection Agency in the United States seen
during the 1970s. See text accompanying notes 234-54. The principal distinction between
the proposed Consumer Protection Agency and some of the administrative enforcement
structures lies in the concept of the Consumer Protection Agency as a consumer advocate
without direct regulatory responsibility. Many of the agencies such as IDEC that have
considerable independence also have extensive regulatory responsibilities. Likewise, agen-
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Although several consumer agencies are placed within existing
ministries, some such as the Venezuelan IDEC enjoy considerable in-
dependence. The institute receives independent funding,2 9 and its
president and directors may be removed only for cause.2 40 Because of
its independence and broad authority over consumer affairs, the
IDEC embodies a model for the consumer protection agency never
enacted in the United States. 41
The enforcement discretion of administrative agencies varies. On
the one hand, the law of Ecuador specifies the fines to be imposed for
a variety of articulated violations with the range of administrative dis-
cretion considerably restricted.2V 42 Some remedies such as seizure of
goods or closure of establishments are normally only available against
repeat offenders. 243 On the other hand, the law of Brazil gives admin-
istrative authorities a number of enforcement devices and grants them
considerable discretion in their application." 4 The codes of Peru and
Venezuela as well as the proposed laws in Argentina and Uruguay,
although differing in some aspects, are closer to the approach adopted
in the Brazilian statute.245 As would be expected, these provisions
often establish general criteria to guide the application of various
sanctions 246
ties that seem to be have a more coordinating function, such as the Proposed Consumer
Office in Chile, are placed within ministries or agencies, thereby reducing their
independence.
Agencies with more focused regulatory responsibilities, as in the United States, argua-
bly enjoy an advantage in expertise and experience. Still, the consumer statutes in South
America have a substantial emphasis on consumer transactional law, and as regulatory
tasks multiply, the structure of administrative regulation may change.
239. VENEZ. CONSUtER C. art. 65.
240. Id. art. 72. Among the reasons for removal are conviction of criminal violations,
administrative misconduct, or serious dereliction of duty through clearly proven ineptitude.
241. See supra note 23S.
242. ECUADOR CONSUMNER C. arts. 35-39.
243. Id. art. 39. The proposed statute in Chile also restricts administrative sanctions in
enforcement. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 19.
244. BRAZ. CONSUIMER C. arts. 55-60.
245. PROPOSED ARc. CONSUMER C. arts. 50-55 (more restriction on the uwe of s anc-
tions); PERU CONSUMER C. art. 39-47; PROPOSED URu. CONSUMER C. arts. 34-42; VEr;Ez.
CONSUMER C. arts. 91-110.
246. See, e.g., PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 54 (in graduating penalties, consider
damage to consumer resulting from infraction, market position of violator, importance of
benefit obtained, character of intent, gravity of social risks or injuries, scope of infraction,
recidivism, and other aspects); PERU CONSUMER C. art. 42 (intention of violator, damage
resulting, profits obtained by violator, and recidivism); PROPOSED URu. CONSUMER C. art.
34 (in graduating penalties, consider risk to health caused by infraction, market position of
violator, amount of benefit received by violator, degree of intent, social benefits, scop2 of
violation, and re-incidence); VENEZ. CONSU~mR C. art. 93 (take into account equity, pro-
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Some statutes, such as that of Ecuador, set forth administrative
procedures to be followed.247 Most statutes appear to operate against
more general codes of administrative procedure with specific modifi-
cations or additions.24s The laws often distinguish summary provi-
sions from those requiring more detailed administrative factfinding
including hearings.249
The Brazilian code exemplifies provisions giving administrative
authorities considerable discretion in the application of a variety of
enforcement sanctions. Like most of the statutes, Brazil's code per-
mits administrative authorities to promulgate regulations and guide-
lines for the interpretation and application of the statute.250 Brazilian
law also permits administrative authorities to collect extensive infor-
mation from the suppliers of consumer goods and services.251 Admin-
istrative authorities are given a variety of enforcement sanctions
including fines, product seizures, prohibitions of manufacture, tempo-
rary or permanent suspension of sales or services, closing of establish-
ments, cancellation of permits, administrative intervention, and
imposition of counteradvertising.252 In addition, administrative au-
thorities may commence both penal~3 and civil actions 5 4 before the
courts.
Although the statutes vary considerably, the bulk of them contain
provisions that suggest effective administrative enforcement of the
consumer protection laws. Because the statutes that contain the most
extensive enforcement schemes also vest administrative agencies with
considerable discretion, the risks of nonenforcement accompanying
such broad discretion indicate that these statutes might not be effec-
tively enforced.
portionality, rationality, especially severity of infraction, dimension of damage, and public
need for product).
247. ECUADOR CONSUMER C. arts. 46-57.
248. See, e.g., PERU CONSUMER C. art. 40 (referring to general administrative
procedures).
249. See, e.g., BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 59; VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 91.
250. B.AZ. CONSUMER C. art. 55 (consumers and suppliers must be involved in devel-
opment of guidelines and regulations).
251. Id. (power to require producers to provide information regarding matters of inter-
est to consumers; due regard must be given to industrial secrets).
252. Id. art. 56.
253. Id. art. 80. Penalties for these offenses are specified in detail.
254. Id. art. 82.
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2. Judicial Enforcement
Judicial enforcement is both an alternative and a supplement to
administrative enforcement. To the extent that private parties can
seek judicial relief, the risk of administrative failure decreases. Most
statutes explicitly preserve the rights of parties physically injured
through violations of the consumer laws to seek redress in the
courts. 55 Even the imposition of administrative sanctions does not
prevent related civil and penal claims.256
The consumer code in Paraguay relies principally upon judicial
rather than administrative enforcement25s As would be expected, the
law gives judges a number of sanctions analogous to those available to
administrative agencies, including prohibiting the distribution or sale
of products, ordering the seizure of dangerous products, temporarily
or permanently closing establishments, levying fines, ordering publica-
tion of sentences in newspapers, magazines and on television, prohib-
iting advertising, striking down unfair terms in contracts of adhesion,
and insuring compliance with the law through any sanctions antici-
pated in the consumer protection law or existing in other legal
norms." 8 The range of these sanctions illustrates the use of the courts
as a substitute for administrative agencies.
Even statutes that rely heavily upon administrative enforcement,
such as the Brazilian code, give the courts significant powers. The
Brazilian code permits fines and a number of devices to compel action
by suppliers prior to the resolution of the action. 9 In addition, courts
may take measures such as search and seizure, the removal of objects
and persons, the undoing of work, and the termination of harmful ac-
tivities. 60 The Brazilian consumer law specifically provides for na-
tional consumer class actions and gives the court considerable
authority in implementing these provisions.61 Other codes give
judges additional powers; for example, the proposed Chilean law per-
255. BRAZ- CONSUMER C. art. 12; PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 18; ECvAD1o
CONSUMER C. arts. 35, 42; PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 31; PERU CONsUMER C. art. 32;
VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 91.
256. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 56; PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 18; PEoT' CoQ:.
SUMER C. art. 39; PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 36. For a discussion of dam ac-
tions for dangerous products, see supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
257. PARA. CONSUMER C. arts. 31-35.
258. id art. 31.
259. BRA7. CONSUMER C. arts. 81-90.
260. Id art. 84.
261. Ild. arts. 91-100.
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mits judges to prohibit advertising and to order counteradvertising.2 6
Presumably to encourage consumers to bring complaints, a number of
codes limit the circumstances in which costs or sanctions can be im-
posed on unsuccessful complainants. 263 Therefore, consumers can
look to the courts for many of the types of relief that would also be
available from administrative agencies.
The consumer statutes also stress arbitration and conciliation.
This emphasis on alternative dispute resolution reflects the obstacles
that judicial procedures can pose for consumers, particularly lower in-
come ones, and the desire to increase the likelihood of consumer re-
dress. The statutes of Peru and Venezuela as well as those proposed
in Chile and Uruguay specifically provide for conciliation or arbitra-
tion of consumer claims.2" These provisions generally rely upon the
establishment of these procedures by administrative agencies respon-
sible for the enforcement of consumer claims.265
The codes also employ other techniques to increase accessibility
to the courts. For example, the proposed Chilean law uses local mag-
istrates as the principal officers for adjudicating consumer com-
plaints,266 and the Brazilian statute permits local concerns to be
considered by municipal courts.267 Both the proposed Argentinean
law and the Venezuelan code provide for simplified procedures where
appropriate.268 These efforts recognize the importance of procedures
that encourage the use of consumer laws. The popular use of these
laws will increase their efficacy.
Of course, the risks of alternative dispute resolution are to de-
prive aggrieved parties of the procedures, personnel, and remedies
provided by the courts and to increase the time and cost of redress.
262. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 60.
263. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 87 (in class actions no prepayment of costs or recovery of
attorney fees against class, but penalties for bad faith litigation); ECUADOR CONSUMER C.
art. 42 (penalties for improvident or malicious allegations); PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 32
(fines for bad faith, subterfuge, incorrect information, or actions "solely" for the advantage
of the complainant). Similar restrictions apply for administrative allegations. E.g., PFRU
CONSUMER C. art. 44 (false denunciations sanctioned by commencing a penal action); PRO
POSED ARG. CONSUMER C. art. 52 (malicious denouncements).
264. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. arts. 43-45; PERU CONSUMER C. art. 38; PRO
POSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 33; VENEZ. CONSUMER C. arts. 81-88.
265. Chile places this function in magistrates. PROPOSED CHILE CONSUMER C. art. 44.
266. Id. art. 46. The code also modified existing procedures. Id. art. 47.
267. BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 93 (class actions).
268. PROPOSED AREG. CONSUMER C. art. 57 (the most abbreviated form of procedure
that regulates the courts will be applied); VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 91 (simplified proce-
dures for claims below a particular amount).
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With one exception, conciliation under the proposed Uruguayan stat-
ute,2 69 the provisions for conciliation and arbitration are voluntary.
Under the Venezuelan code, neither conciliation nor arbitration is ap-
propriate if the violation of the law endangers human life or healthy °1
Alternative dispute resolution is not imposed upon the parties as a
condition for reaching the courts. Therefore, these provisions are
more concerned with the parties' convenience than with judicial effi-
ciency. Indeed, the Brazilian law declares unfair any provision in a
consumer contract requiring compulsory arbitration of claims27 1
The consumer protection laws in South America create a judicial
role that is perhaps inconsistent with the general conception of a
judge's role under a civil code. These consumer codes, particularly
provisions drawn from the United States through the Mexican code,
assume that the judiciary -, i be more willing to make policy and to
implement the underlying statutory goals than civil law judges gener-
ally have been in South America. In addition, the civil litigation sys-
tems in South America with their emphasis on judicial control and
documentary procedures may have problems accommodating the
level of party involvement and oral procedures contemplated in some
of the codes. The application of these laws requires and encourages
some modifications in the role of the judge.
3. The Role of Consumer Groups
Some of these South American consumer protection laws give
consumer organizations important roles in both administrative and ju-
dicial enforcement. The recognition and assignment of these roles
may be the most important provisions of these laws.
For example, in the Brazilian code any consumer or entity repre-
senting consumers may request the attorney general to commence an
action to have unfair contract provisions declared void.Y" In addition
to the class action provisions of the code, consumer organizations may
seek judicial redress in certain circumstances in which common claims
or interests are affected.273 In the Paraguayan law, nonprofit con-
sumer organizations may press both administrative and judicial action
269. PROPOSED URU. CONSUMER C. art. 33(11).
270. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 81.
271. BRAZ. CONSUNMR C. art. 51.
272. Id.
273. Id. art. 81.
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when one of their members is directly affected.2 74 Under the Vene-
zuelan law any interested party can request an investigation by IDEC,
and consumer organizations enjoy fights to participate in administra-
tive and judicial proceedings similar to those enjoyed in Brazil. 75
These fights give consumer organizations an important role in en-
forcement and increase the likelihood that consumer groups can influ-
ence enforcement decisions. Not surprisingly, national registers of
consumer organizations permit a determination of the groups able to
exercise these rights,2 76 but create the risk of state regulation of the
enforcement activities of these groups.277
In addition to these formal roles, other provisions assume that
consumer groups will play important roles in consumer education and
even in the testing of products.27 These formal and informal roles
permit consumer organizations to influence consumer policy and en-
forcement in a variety of ways.
The establishment of administrative agencies designed primarily
to protect consumer interests and the role of consumer organizations
increases the likelihood of enforcement. The special mission of these
agencies improves the chances that they will enforce these consumer
laws. Moreover, their influence and perhaps survival may depend
upon enforcement. The ability of consumers to affect the actions of
these agencies also supports enforcement.
The U.N. Guidelines admonish countries to adopt some enforce-
ment mechanism and encourage consumer organizations to monitor
improper practices harmful to consumer interests, but do not recom-
mend any particular approach to administrative or judicial enforce-
ment.2 79 Likewise, the IOCU's Model Consumer Protection
Legislation assumes some enforcement procedures, at least judicial
ones, but does not propose any specific enforcement scheme.
274. PARA. CONSUMER C. art. 33 (no requirement of effect on a consumer affiliated
with the group for challenges regarding harmful food, medicine, or television
advertisements).
275. VENEZ. CONSUMER C. art. 112.
276. Id. art. 75(10).
277. Id. art. 94. Consumer organizations can be removed from the registry for viola-
tions of certain standards.
278. Id.; PROPOSED ARG. CONSUMER C. arts. 48(b),(e), 63. As discussed previously,
many of the codes assume a close connection between administrative agencies and con-
sumer groups and emphasize the importance of consumer education. In addition, the Bra-
zilian code encourages collective economic action by consumer groups and cooperatives.
See BRAz. CONSUMER C. art. 107
279. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, paras. 28-30.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION
LAWS IN SOUTH AMERICA
The context and the content of South American consumer pro-
tection laws suggest the uniqueness of the legal development occur-
ring there. The enactment of a number of provisions in a short period
of time, the similarities in the content of the codes, and the number
and variety of nonlocal influences on the content of the codes all em-
phasize the importance of examining the codes as a group. Group
examination reveals implications less easily perceived in the evalua-
tion of individual consumer statutes because individual evaluation
tends to emphasize the application of substantive standards to local
conditions.
Consumer protection laws in South America exemplify an "inter-
nationalization" of areas of local law, including contractual and ex-
tracontractual rights usually conceived as domestic. When so viewed,
these laws illustrate how widely shared practices and international
guidelines can affect local practice. The effect of these international
influences clouds the distinctions between binding international norms
and influential but non-binding international guidelines and practices.
Consumer protection laws suggest a hybrid between the view that
these consumer laws simply represent domestic choices among op-
tions presented by a variety of models and another view of a more
complex regional and international process in which domestic choices
are constrained and guided by the choices of others.2 By viewing
these laws as a group, we are alerted to the very rapid establishment
of a much more complex legal environment than the evaluation of an
individual law might suggest.
Recognition of this environment offers opportunities. Such rec-
ognition offers the opportunity to frame these statutes in the larger
context of human rights law. It also provides an opportunity to ex-
plore regional regulatory policies with greater reliance on regional or-
ganizations. Moreover, it allows speculation regarding the impact of
these provisions on domestic legal systems, and it permits study of the
implementation of a group of roughly contemporaneous statutes and
analysis of the importance of nongovernmental organizations operat-
ing transnationally. Finally, it frames U.S. regulatory interests in a re-
gional and international context.
280. Harmonization of laws poses the risk that provisions adopted will be inappropriate
for the circumstances in which they are applied. In addition, uniformity can stifle legal
development and deprive others of novel examples and experiments.
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Consumer protection laws in South America rest heavily upon
concepts of individual rights and dignity. Individuals are entitled to
certain rights and to certain treatment solely as human beings. To one
commentator, the failure of governments to protect consumers from
injury seems analogous to the failure of governments to protect their
citizens from political violence.2 1 Consumer laws reflect the use of
rights of political participation by consumer groups. The application
and development of consumer laws should help create and nurture
more open and democratic societies. The consumer protection laws of
South America support an examination of consumer protection from
the perspective of human rights.
The U.N. Guidelines call for support of consumer protection by
regional organizations.282 To date, the Organization of American
States (OAS) has done little to meet this call. Regional development
of laws has preceded involvement by the OAS, but the organization
can still perform useful functions by encouraging dialogue and educa-
tion. As the consumer movements in South America mature, they will
begin to act together to strengthen both the content and enforcement
of consumer laws. The OAS offers a potential forum for these con-
cerns. In addition, individual countries may have difficulty in effec-
tively regulating large multinational producers such as pharmaceutical
manufacturers. In these circumstances, regional coordination could
result in more effective regulation. Finally, the possibilities of some
regional integration in South America will require consideration of
uniform regulation of a number of issues, one of the more important
of which will be consumer protection, particularly product quality and
safety.
Some provisions of the recently enacted consumer statutes may
be seen, depending on one's perspective, as either "friendly" or "hos-
tile" viruses that introduce into national legal systems concepts and
procedures with the potential for altering the character of those sys-
tems. The effect of these consumer laws on the character of litigation
and administration presents one possible example.
The implementation of a number of contemporaneously enacted
similar laws provides the basis for a number of important studies in
comparative law. These studies could evaluate the efficacy of varying
substantive regulations and different enforcement regimes. More-
281. Claudio Grossman, Consumer Rights and Human Rights, Paper Delivered to the
Second Regional Conference of IOCU for Latin America and the Caribbean (Nov. 19,
1990) (on file with author).
282. U.N. Guidelines, supra note 10, para. 43.
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over, the implementation of these statutes permits a much richer ex-
amination of their relationships and of the strategies and tactics of
consumer and business groups.2-3
The United States cannot ignore these consumer protection laws
or their implications. If implemented, these provisions will establish a
different environment for U.S. companies doing business in South
America.
These statutes also directly implicate the effectiveness of U.S.
consumer protection laws. Aside from the contentious question of the
effect of trade agreements on protections provided by U.S. domestic
law, effective consumer protection laws in South America strengthen
U.S. protections. To the extent that the level of protections provided
by U.S. and South American laws converge, the problems of conflict-
ing standards are somewhat reduced. If U.S. domestic law regulates
product standards and safety, U.S. consumers have a direct interest in
the character of consumer protection laws elsewhere. For example,
U.S. inspection resources are inadequate to examine more than a por-
tion of the products entering the United States.2  To the extent, how-
ever, that the law of the producing state imposes requirements similar
to those in the United States, the greater the likelihood that the prod-
ucts would satisfy U.S. standards. The producer would have reduced
incentive to produce products for export using different standards and
techniques than those required in the domestic or regional markets in
which the product is sold. In this sense, the U.S. consumer would ben-
efit from the enforcement of other countries' laws. Given the context
283. A recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment of 241 drugs produc2d by
U.S. manufacturers and marketed abroad found that two-thirds of the drug labels failed to
give enough information to use the drugs safely and effectively. John Schartz, U.S. Drug
Makers Criticized for Export Medicine Labels, WASH. Post. May 21, 1993, at A2. One of
the countries to which such drugs were exported was Brazil. Id. The study took s vtn
years to complete; meanwhile, the Brazilian and other consumer statutes %% cre pavxcd in
the interim. For a discussion of labeling requirements and how some South American
countries' statutes treat medicines, see supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
284. For example, the General Accounting Office has criticized the limited fampling of
imported food by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). UNrrED STrTS G .EcrPL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE RANKING MINorr mBE R, SuBco}'I~irrri- oCr
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PoucY AND TRADE, ComrMIrEE oNi ForEmG- AttAIPs,
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FDA CAN h1MPROVE MONrrORING OF IMTORTED CHEEsE
(1992). "[WMhile the total number of imported food entries [in the New York District of
the FDA] had more than tripled since the early 1970s, resources dedicated to these insp.ec-
tions had remained static. As a result, the percentage of import entries inspected by the
agency had declined by over 50% during the same period." rd. at 7. The FDA's reliance
on certification programs in other countries, in the case of cheese, lacked any data to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the foreign country's certification program. Id. at 2.
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of free trade discussions with Chile and the potential for a trading bloc
encompassing North and South America, the character of consumer
protection laws in South America becomes a matter of domestic
concern.
The intuition of great religious thinkers has been the solidarity of
all humans. The globalization of economies allows us to see more eas-
ily the reality of this intuition. In truth, a victory for consumer protec-
tion in one place is also a victory elsewhere. Likewise, a loss
anywhere portends a loss elsewhere.
V. CONCLUSION
In a short period of time, a number of South American countries
have enacted consumer protection laws, and such laws are currently
pending in several other South American countries. These laws share
numerous common influences. Important among these influences
have been the U.N. Guidelines on Consumer Protection and the inter-
national consumer movement, particularly the IOCU. The fall of au-
thoritarian regimes and the growth of free market economies have
created a hospitable climate for these laws. Enforcement and applica-
tion of these laws promise to aid the expansion and consolidation of
democracy.
South American consumer protection laws address a number of
common issues. Despite their differences, these laws often reflect
similar approaches to protection. Generally, the consumer codes pro-
vide creditable enforcement procedures using both administrative and
judicial enforcement. Several of the codes give consumer organiza-
tions important roles in enforcement and in the development of con-
sumer protection policy.
South American consumer protection laws raise a number of im-
plications regarding the relationship between consumer protection
and human rights, the role of regional organizations (such as the
OAS) and regional and international consumer groups, and the possi-
ble changes to the legal systems of countries enacting these laws.
These consumer statutes also affect U.S. businesses and the effective-
ness of consumer protection laws in the United States.
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